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Note
Weighing Down the Cloud: The Public Performance
Right and the Internet After Aereo
Samuel J. Dykstra*
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the
Supreme Court concluded that Aereo’s streaming of broadcast
television programs over the Internet to its subscribers was an
infringing public performance under the Copyright Act of 1976
(“Copyright Act”). The Court interpreted the “Transmit Clause” of the
Copyright Act to mean that when determining whether a performance
created by a transmission is to “the public” the relevant audience is not
that of a particular transmission, but of the work being transmitted.
Thus, it did not matter that Aereo operated by creating unique copies
and via separate transmissions available to only one subscriber when
the same underlying work was being transmitted.
However, the Court’s interpretation has the strong potential of
sweeping up formerly legal activities of the developing cloud computing
industry due to key shared features between it and Aereo: the remote
storage of unique copies of the same work, transmitted to subscribers
through separate transmissions. The Court’s opinion offers lower
courts and cloud developers little guidance on how to apply the new
interpretation, thereby creating legal uncertainty for future cloud
developments and copyright law generally.
This Note first reviews the development of copyright law, focusing on
the revision to the public performance right, with special emphasis on
how Supreme Court cases involving cable television influenced the
passage of the Copyright Act and inclusion of the Transmit Clause. It
then discusses subsequent technological developments that challenged
* Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. expected May 2016; B.A., University of
San Francisco, 2009. I would like to thank the staff and Editorial Board of the Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal for their helpful feedback and hard work. I also would like to especially
thank my parents (Mitty and Dan), my brother Jack and his wife Teresa, as well as Adrienne
Yoseph, for their love, support, and encouragement while writing this Note and in everything
else.
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the meaning of the public performance right, highlighting an earlier but
similar case that reached the opposite interpretation of Aereo. Next,
this Note turns to Aereo, analyzing the opinion and discussing
alternatives to the Court’s interpretation that would still protect
copyright holders. This Note concludes by arguing that the Court’s
decision likely will reduce investment in cloud technologies as
developers will be uncertain of the legality of their services, while
likewise encouraging litigation against existing technologies that,
following Aereo, might be construed as engaging in infringing public
performances.
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INTRODUCTION
New technologies consistently challenge existing copyright regimes
as they create new modes of expression, distribution, reproduction, and
consumption.1 Historically, these technological advances served as the
catalyst for copyright reform as they changed the balance between the
constitutional goals of promoting innovation and the spread of
knowledge and those of protecting authors and inventors.2 Today
copyright law guarantees a series of “exclusive rights,”3 two of which—
the right to “reproduce”4 and the right to “perform a copyrighted work
publicly”5—have repeatedly been challenged by technological
innovations such as radio,6 cable television,7 home recording
technologies,8 and, most recently, the Internet.9
1. See COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW 1 (Brad Sherman & Leanne Wisemen
eds., 2012) (describing copyright law as a “creature of technology” subject to change based on the
challenges new technologies present); JESSICA REYMAN, THE RHETORIC OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 57–58 (2010) (noting how technology has routinely been an impetus to copyright
reform).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. (commonly referred to as the “Copyright Clause,” it lays
down the purpose of copyright protections as “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST § 1-004 (2002) (relating how rapid technological change in recent decades has caused
interested parties to call upon legislators to update laws to “keep pace with new technologies”).
The Supreme Court has confirmed that the phrase “Progress of Science” is to be interpreted as
referring to “the creation and spread of knowledge and learning.” Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873, 888 (2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
4. Id. § 106(1); see, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 79
(2d Cir. 2014) (discussing whether an infringing reproduction occurred when a news service
recorded and subsequently disseminated the recording of a discussion of Swatch Group’s recently
released earnings report).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5); see, e.g., Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing whether the public performance right had been infringed
in the context of musical performances and recordings played in a restaurant).
6. See Jerome H. Remick Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 411 (6th Cir. 1925)
(addressing the (at the time) novel question of whether radio broadcasts constituted a public
performance). While this case predates the Copyright Act of 1976, an earlier copyright act passed
in 1909 likewise granted an exclusive public performance right. See id.
7. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 405 (1974)
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (discussing whether the importing of television broadcast signals
to areas where they otherwise would not reach constituted a “performance”); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)),
as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (discussing
if local cable television systems were infringing right holders’ public performance rights).
8. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419 (1984)
(discussing whether Sony facilitated the infringement of protected works by selling its video tape

DYKSTRA PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

992

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/27/2015 2:41 PM

[Vol. 46

Close to forty years ago, cable television’s challenge to existing
copyright law culminated in the Supreme Court’s Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. and Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc. decisions. In these two cases the Court found
that cable television systems did not infringe the public performance
rights held by broadcast television providers when cable companies
retransmitted protected broadcast television programs to cable
subscribers.10 Arguably in response,11 Congress included in the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) the “Transmit Clause,” which
redefined the statutory characterization of a public performance to
capture those retransmissions and other technologies not encompassed
within the old definition.12 Thus, the Transmit Clause added a new
analysis to the public performance right based on the existence of a
transmission and whether the public was capable of receiving it, and
expanded the right to include a new range of activity not previously
protected: cable television retransmission, videocassette rental stores
providing screening rooms, and hotels that transmitted movies to
individual rooms upon a guest’s request.13

recorder to consumers who would use the device to make reproductions of those works); Fox
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that athome digital video recorder (“DVR”) technology did not infringe); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that remote-storage DVR systems
did not infringe the Act’s public performance right).
9. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–21 (2005)
(discussing whether the distributers of peer-to-peer file sharing networks enabled consumers to
infringe the reproduction right of copyright holders).
10. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405 (extending the Fortnightly decision to situations where the
CATV provider imported signals that would not be available to a consumer via analog broadcast);
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395 (finding that cable television systems “did not perform . . . in any
conventional sense of that term, or in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law
in 1909”).
11. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (citing to a
legislative report complied after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 which contained a
passage stating that the law “completely overturn[s]” the prior decisions (H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476
at 87 (1976)). But see id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty of determining
congressional intent from “a single report issued by a committee whose members make up a
small fraction of one of the two Houses of Congress”).
12. See Glynn S. Lunney, Aereo and Copyright’s Private-Public Performance Line, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 205, 208 (2014) (noting that Congress “expressly rejected” the Court’s findings that
cable television did not infringe when Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 and included
provisions to make cable television liable); Brad M. McBride, Omission by “Particular
Transmission”: Preventing the Circumvention of the Transmit Clause, 18 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1,
11–12 (2014) (discussing how Congress “sought to reverse” Fortnightly and Teleprompter and
“create a statute that was adaptable” to new and changing technologies).
13. See SHELDON W. HALPERN, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 1-006[D][2]–[3] (4th ed. 2012) (discussing the passage of the Copyright Act of
1976 and the addition of the Transmit Clause); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO
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While the Copyright Act apparently resolved what constituted a
public performance, a new technology, Remote Storage Digital Video
Recorders (“RS-DVR”), would eventually challenge the meaning of the
Transmit Clause.14
RS-DVRs allow multiple subscribers,
independently, to choose to record a copyrighted television program for
later viewing; store their subscriber copy remotely; and later discretely
transmit said copies from a cable television facility to the subscriber at
the subscriber’s request.15
Television program providers, again
confronted with a disruptive new technology, argued that this process
was infringing their public performance rights.16 In response, the
Second Circuit in 2008 interpreted the Transmit Clause to mean that a
public performance occurred only if a particular transmission was to
“the public,” as opposed to whether the same underlying work
(embodied in separate transmissions) was offered “to the public.”17
In June 2014, the Supreme Court handed down its latest foray into
defining the public performance right with its decision in American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.18
Legal scholars
anticipated that the Aereo decision could have significant repercussions
for copyright law, the Internet, and particularly cloud computing, given
Aereo’s shared features with cloud-based technologies: the remote
storage and digital transmission of content.19 The Court however, held

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 ch. 7, at 3 (1977) (“Under the definition of ‘perform’ in section
101 it is clear that the following would constitute a performance of a work: live renditions that are
face to face, renditions from recordings, broadcasting, retransmission by loudspeakers, and
transmission and retransmission by cable, microwave, etc.”).
14. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir 2008) (discussing
whether an infringing public performance occurred when remotely stored programs, individually
copied by subscribers, were subsequently and separately transmitted to subscribers at different
times and locations); see infra Part I.B (discussing this litigation in detail).
15. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124, 134; see Megan Cavender, RS-DVR Slides Past Its
First Obstacle and Gets the Pass for Full Implementations, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 145, 148 (2008)
(“[S]everal major television networks have attempted to prevent [RS-DVR’s] implementation
without proper licensing by filing suit against Cablevision (also referred to as CSC Holdings,
Inc.) in federal court alleging direct copyright infringement.” (internal citations omitted)).
16. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124 (noting that the plaintiffs argued that operators of the
RS-DVR system directly infringed their public performance right).
17. Id. at 135; see Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk about Aereo:
Copyright-Avoiding Business Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit”
Clause 11 (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 480, 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443595 (discussing the Second Circuit’s
analysis of the Transmit Clause in the RS-DVR litigation).
18. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
19. See Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 3, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461)
(hereinafter Brief of 36 Law Professors) (describing how a ruling against Aereo could upset
existing doctrines of copyright law such as direct and secondary liability); David Carr, Aereo
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that Aereo directly infringed various copyright holders’ public
performance rights, finding that the Aereo service—broadcast television
streamed over the Internet—was “substantially similar” to cable
television,20 and that a primary purpose of Congress in drafting the
Copyright Act was to overturn Teleprompter and Fortnightly.21
Moreover, and at odds with prior lower court interpretations of the
Transmit Clause, the Court found it did not matter that Aereo
functioned via individual copies and separate transmissions, given that
Aereo was still transmitting the same underlying work.22 This Note
argues that the Court’s decision casts into uncertainty the legality of the
rapidly evolving cloud computing industry by adopting an interpretation
of the Transmit Clause that focused on the underlying performance
rather than the particular transmission, coupled with its amorphous,
sufficiently-similar-to-cable-television rationale.23

Case Will Shape TV’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2014, at B4 (“[P]eople will be watching to
see [what Aereo means] for the broader media ecosystem.”); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at
42 (discussing the “serious challenge” to copyright law that Aereo poses); Amy Howe, But What
About the “Cloud”? The Aereo Argument in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 24 2014, 2:49
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/but-what-about-the-cloud-the-aereo-argument-in-plain
-english/ (describing the Justices’ pointed question about what effect a ruling against Aereo
would have on “the cloud”). “Cloud Computing” is a generic term for many Internet-based
technologies that provide remote storage of information among other services. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology provides the following definition: “Cloud computing is a
model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services)
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, THE NIST
DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011).
20. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“Aereo’s activities are
substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to
reach . . . .”). The Court referred to its decisions in the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cases
discussed below. See infra Part I.B (discussing Fortnightly and Teleprompter in the context of
the development of the public performance right).
21. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507, 2511. The Court cited to a legislative report complied after the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 which contained a passage stating that the law “completely
overturn[s]” the prior decisions. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 87 (1976). For a discussion of direct
liability for copyright Infringement before Aereo, see WILLIAM PATRY, COPYRIGHT § 9:5.50
(2014) (reviewing the application of the volitional act requirement in direct infringement cases);
see also infra Part I.E (discussing the application of direct versus contributory liability in the
context of copyright infringement via automated digital systems).
22. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509; see Eleanor Lackman, Symposium: Preferring Substance Over
Form and Nature Over Manner, Supreme Court Finds that Aereo runs afoul of the purpose of the
Copyright Act, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/sy
mposium-preferring-substance-over-form-and-nature-over-manner-supreme-court-finds-that-aere
o-runs-afoul-of-the-purposes-of-the-copyright-act/ (discussing the Court’s determination that
Aereo’s technological differences did not distinguish it from cable television in that they both
share the same commercial objective).
23. For a discussion of Aereo’s possible effects on cloud computing see, e.g., Mitch Stoltz,
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Part I of this Note discusses the history of copyright law leading up to
the inclusion of the Transmit Clause into the Copyright Act, as well as
relevant challenges to the Copyright Act based on subsequent
technological developments.24 Part II discusses the Court’s reasoning
in Aereo and explores the parties’ arguments.25 Part III analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the majority opinion and explores viable
alternative resolutions to the litigation.26 Finally, Part IV discusses the
impact that the Court’s approach will have on interpreting the public
performance right in the context of the Internet.27 Part IV explores the
potential effect that the Court’s interpretation will have on evolving
cloud computing networks that could, in the wake of Aereo, be
interpreted as infringing copyright holders’ public performance rights.28
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the importance of the addition of the Transmit
Clause to the Copyright Act’s public performance right, this Part first
briefly reviews the development of copyright protection in the United
States.29 This Part next discusses key Supreme Court cases interpreting
the public performance right of the Copyright Act of 1909 that were
instrumental to Congress inserting the Transmit Clause.30 Next, this
Part discusses the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, the insertion of
the Transmit Clause and its immediate impact.31 Then this Part
Symposium: Aereo Decision Injects Uncertainty into Copyright, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2014,
2:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-decision-injects-uncertainty-int
o-copyright/ (“Defining the bounds of ‘similarity’ to a cable system will require much litigation,
and cases comparing cloud storage systems and other new technologies against cable systems will
be complex and expensive.”); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the implications Aereo has for
cloud computing systems).
24. See infra Part I (examining the history of the Transmit Clause and subsequent interpretive
challenges to the Copyright Act of 1976 posed by new technologies).
25. See infra Part II (explicating the Court’s decision in Aereo as well as the parties’
arguments).
26. See infra Part III (analyzing the merits of Court’s holding that separate transmissions of
the same underlying work constitutes a public performance and exploring viable alternative
outcomes for the case).
27. See infra Part IV (discussing the Aereo decision’s impact on the development of cloudbased technologies).
28. See infra Part IV (discussing the Aereo decision’s impact on existing cloud technologies
that arguably are publicly performing by separately transmitting the same underlying work to
different subscribers).
29. See infra Part I.A (reviewing the history of copyright law in the United States,
emphasizing the public performance right).
30. See infra Part I.B (discussing important Supreme Court cases leading up to the passage of
the Copyright Act of 1976).
31. See infra Part I.C (reviewing the passage of Copyright Act of 1976 and focusing on the
inclusion of the Transmit Clause).

DYKSTRA PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

996

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/27/2015 2:41 PM

[Vol. 46

discusses Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. and
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., cases in which courts
wrestled with how the developments of the remote storage of content,
the Internet, and content sharing fit into the Copyright Act.32 Finally,
this Part briefly reviews some interpretive modes, important to the
Aereo litigation, that courts have developed to assess liability under the
Copyright Act, including the distinction between secondary and direct
liability and the volitional act test.33
A. Brief History of Copyright and the Public
Performance Right
The Constitution provides that authors and inventors should have, for
a limited time, exclusive rights to their works, with the underlying
purpose “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”34 This
Copyright Clause provided Congress with the power to enact copyright
legislation, which it did first in 179035 and periodically thereafter.36
However, because of these dual objectives, it has largely been perceived
that that appropriate interpretation of this clause requires the balancing
of its protectionist elements, which ensure the author receives the fruits
of her labor, and the interest of the public to have access to such
discoveries in order to further innovate and better society as a whole.37
As such, the original act of 1790 was quite limited, granting only
authors of books, maps, or charts exclusive rights to print, reprint,

32. See infra Part I.D (discussing important interpretations of the Copyright Act of 1976
arising out of RS-DVR and Internet technologies).
33. See infra Part I.E (discussing important analytical tools the courts have used in assessing
copyright liability).
34. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (2d 2006)
(noting that “the basic purpose of copyright” in the United States “is to enrich our society’s
wealth of culture and information” and the copyright protections are only “the means for doing
so”); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the use of
“Progress of Science” as being “the creation and spread of knowledge and learning”).
35. Act of May 21, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat. 124.
36. See HALPERN, supra note 13, § 1.01[B] (discussing the history of United States Copyright
law); see also DAVIES, supra note 2, § 5-001 (discussing the same).
37. See DAVIES, supra note 2, § 5-023 (reviewing the role the concern for the public interest
has had in the development of United States copyright law); GORMAN, supra note 34, at 1
(describing this clause as “both a source of and a limitation on Congress’ power to enact
copyright and patent statutes”); DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1–05 (2014) (describing the
phrase as creating a balance between the interests of the authors and “the interest of the public in
ultimately claiming free access to the materials essential to the development of society”). See
generally ALINA NG, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS
(2011) (analyzing the paired aims of copyright protection and promoting the progress of science
and the useful arts in American copyright law).
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publish, or vend for a period of fourteen years.38 Pushes by rights
holders gradually increased the duration of copyright protection as well
as expanded the scope to encompass musical works, paintings,
drawings, chromolithographs, photographs, statues, and statuaries, so by
the time of the second general revision of the law in 1870, the exclusive
rights period lasted twenty-eight years, with a fourteen-year renewal
period.39 Particularly relevant here was the amendment of 1856, which
granted the first limited public performance right to dramatic
compositions.40 Previous attempts, as early as 1841, to include a public
performance right did not even make it to the Senate floor for a vote.41
The next revision of the copyright laws came with the Act of 1909
(“1909 Act”), which, among other things, expanded the public
performance protections already afforded to dramatic works and
musical compositions to lectures, sermons, addresses, and similar
productions, so long as they were for profit.42 One other addition
introduced in the 1909 Act was the concept of the compulsory license,43
which would later be adopted for cable television as well.44 This

38. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 § 1; see 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 30–34 (1994) (discussing the 1790 law).
39. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 212–16 §§ 85–111; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 36–
45 (discussing the developments and proposed amendments leading up to the Act of 1870). In
particular, during the first session of the Eighteenth Congress, a famous painter, Rembrandt
Peale, requested that the senator from Pennsylvania introduce a bill to extend copyright to
paintings in order to protect his famous equestrian portrait of George Washington. Id. at 45. This
push was not successful in 1824 and it was not until the Act of 1870 before paintings would
receive protection. Id.
40. 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 41 (noting that the 1856 amendment granted “the first right of
public performance”); see Act of August 18th, 1856, 11 Stat. 138–39 (“That any copyright
hereafter granted . . . to the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition . . . shall be deemed
and taken to confer upon . . . the sole right . . . to act, perform, or represent the same, or cause it to
be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public place during the whole period for
which the copyright is obtained . . . .”).
41. See DAVIES, supra note 2, § 5-005 (discussing developments in United States copyright
law from 1790 to 1909); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 41 (discussing the passage of the 1856
amendment).
42. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 56–
60 (discussing the revisions to copyright included in the 1909 Act).
43. 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 59 (noting that the 1909 Act “introduce[ed] a new concept into
U.S. copyright law, the compulsory license”); see Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat.
1075 § 1(e) (setting out the ability of an owner to authorize initial reproduction of a work, subject
to a requirement that subsequent reproductions by other persons must pay to the copyright
proprietor a specified royalty amount). In general, a “compulsory license” is defined as “a
statutorily granted license to do an act covered by an exclusive right, without the prior authority
of the rightowner.” J. A. L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW § 32.03 (3d ed. 2008).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (creating the compulsory license for cable television). For the
development of the compulsory license for cable television, see infra Part I.D (discussing the use
of the compulsory license to ensure that cable television providers paid fees to broadcast
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addition to the copyright protection scheme was a response to the
Supreme Court’s decision dealing with a new technological innovation
in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.45 White-Smith
involved the manufacture of piano rolls, which, when placed into the
piano-roll player, would produce music. The question before the Court
was whether the use of the piano roll constituted an infringing
reproduction of a protected work.46 The Court concluded that a music
roll, which, in conjunction with a mechanical device, made music, was
dissimilar from a copy of sheet music, and that under the definitions of
the 1870 revisions to the copyright law the piano roll did not constitute
a “copy” of a protected work.47 The 1909 Act, however, instead of
directly overturning the White-Smith opinion, instituted a compulsory
license whereby manufacturers of the piano rolls did not have to seek
permission from the rights holder beforehand, but instead were required
to pay a royalty to them on each manufactured piece.48
Nevertheless, the limits of the public performance right contained in
the 1909 Act were soon put to the test by the widespread adoption of the
radio.49 This occurred in part because the terms “public” and
“performance” were not defined in the 1909 Act.50 Chiefly, in Buck v.
television providers).
45. 209 U.S. 1 (1908), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)); see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at
57, 59 (noting the dispute over the White-Smith ruling).
46. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co, 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908), superseded by
statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)); see Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel Ellen Kopp, The Digital
Revolution Is Being Downloaded: Why and How the Copyright Act Must Change to
Accommodate an Ever-Evolving Music Industry, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 284 (2006)
(“Player piano rolls were made without copying the actual notes on staff paper, but instead, they
were made by having perforations in the rolls that mechanically caused notes to be played on the
piano as the rolls rotated.”).
47. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18; see Wagman & Kopp, supra note 46, at 284 (discussing how
in White-Smith “the Supreme Court determined that player piano rolls did not constitute
reproductions of musical compositions, and therefore, they were not infringing upon the
copyright owners’ rights in those compositions”).
48. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 § 1(e); see 2 PATRY, supra note 38,
at 59 (discussing White-Smith and the addition of the compulsory license); Wagman & Kopp,
supra note 46, at 284 (“The result in White-Smith was overturned by the 1909 Act, which granted
musical work copyright owners the right to control the ‘mechanical reproduction’ of their
works”).
49. See Graeme Austin, Radio: Early Battles over the Public Performance Right, in
COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW, supra note 1, §§ 5.01 to 5.03 (discussing the
development of radio technology and the resultant courtroom battles over radio and the public
performance right); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 879–84 (discussing the development of the
Copyright Act of 1909 and the challenges to it posed by radio).
50. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 § 1(e) (in relevant part the Act stated
“[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition and for the
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Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., the Supreme Court was asked to address
whether a hotel’s wiring to each room radio broadcasts captured on its
master receiver constituted an infringing performance under the 1909
Act.51 The hotel argued that there could be only one performance each
time a “performance was rendered” (i.e., the one made by the radio
broadcaster), and the one who received or distributed that transmission
could not, therefore, be said to perform.52
The Court disagreed, holding that there was nothing in the 1909 Act
that limited the definition of performance to a single “rendition” and,
furthermore, the novelty of the hotel’s technological innovation did not
abrogate the Court’s duty to protect rights holders.53 Moreover, the
Court characterized the process of receiving radio waves and translating
them into sound as more than simply listening to another performance,
but “essentially a reproduction.”54 This decision settled, for a time,
whether retransmission constituted a separate performance and helped
establish the multiple performance doctrine.55 However, this point
would later be reexamined in the very similar context of cable
television.56
purpose of public performance for profit”). For an enlightening discussion of the public
performance right as codified in the Copyright Act of 1909, see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 881–
83 (noting in particular “[s]ince the 1909 Act did not define the terms ‘performance,’ ‘public’
performance, and public performance ‘for profit,’ it was left to the courts to determine the legal
meaning of these terms”).
51. 283 U.S. 191, 195 (1931). The parties agreed on the issue of whether, if there was a
performance, it was to the public. Id.; see Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 697, 719 (2008) (“Gene Buck, charged the LaSalle Hotel with ‘maintain[ing] a master
radio receiving set . . . wired to each of the public and private rooms’ in a hotel.” (footnotes
omitted)).
52. Buck, 283 U.S. at 198; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 883–84 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Buck).
53. Buck, 283 U.S. at 198.
54. Id. at 200; see Larry Earl Kelly, Copyright, Performance and CATV, 25 BAYLOR L. REV.
637, 638–40 (1973) (discussing the public performance right and the Buck decision); Stadler,
supra note 51, at 719 (“[T]he Court declared itself ‘satisfied that the reception of a radio
broadcast and its translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program. It
was, instead, ‘essentially a reproduction.’” (footnotes omitted)).
55. See 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 883 (noting how Buck rejected prior cases such as Jerome
H. Remick & Co v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), which held that a radio station’s
broadcast of an orchestra’s performance did not engage in a separate performance); Kelly, supra
note 54, at 639–40 (noting this case settled the point that reproduction of any broadcast by means
of a receiving set was a separate and distinct performance).
56. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2500 (2014) (the majority opinion calling Buck a “questionable 35-yearold-decision”); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s treatment of separate performances
in the context of cable television retransmitting broadcast television shows).
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The next major case interpreting the 1909 Act’s application to radio
was Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co.,
in which the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a radio broadcast was to
the “public” within the meaning of the Act.57 The Sixth Circuit, in
finding that such a broadcast was public, disregarded the contention that
the performance was not public because the listeners were in separate
places.58 Instead, the court focused on how radio broadcasts are
intended to reach a number of people as well as the commercial nature
of a radio enterprise.59 Nonetheless, as new technologies developed
different modes of performance throughout the twentieth century, novel
legal challenges continued to arise, pushing against the meaning and
limitations of the 1909 Act.60
B. Cable Television and the Public Performance Right
The advent of cable television—somewhat surprisingly given the
functional similarities between radio and television as well as
similarities in user experience61—gave rise to an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to reassess the meaning of “public performance” under
the 1909 Act. At the time of the Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc. case, existing cable television—or community antenna

57. 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925); see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 886 (noting that the issue of
whether a performance was to the public under the 1909 Act was not widely litigated, but citing
to Jerome H. Remick as one instance of the issue actually being litigated).
58. Jerome H. Remick, 5 F.2d at 412 (“A performance, in our judgment, is no less public
because the listeners are unable to communicate with one another, or are not assembled within an
inclosure [sic], or gathered together in some open stadium or park or other public place.”).
59. Id. (“It suffices, as there held, that the purpose of the performance be for profit, and not
eleemosynary; it is against a commercial, as distinguished from a purely philanthropic, public use
of another’s composition, that the statute is directed.”); see Bart A. Lazar, Mere Reception in
Public Under the Copyright Act of 1976: Exempt or Extinct?, 1 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 97, 104
n.30 (1991) (“The rationale is that radio stations are profit-making organizations that derive
income from advertising. They earn money by playing music; therefore, the performance is for
profit.”).
60. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REP ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (House Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS] (“Commercial radio and television [was] unknown in 1909. . . . These and other
technical advances have brought in new industries and new methods for the reproduction and
dissemination of the literary musical, pictorial, and artistic works that comprise the subject matter
of copyright. . . . [And a] general reexamination and revision [of copyright law] have been urged
on all sides.”); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 883–95 (discussing the courts’ interpretations of the
1909 Act and attempted legislative responses, culminating in the Copyright Act of 1976).
61. See Kelly, supra note 54, at 641–43 (discussing the similarities between radio and
television and suggesting that a similar legal reasoning should apply in assessing copyright
liability); Daniel E. Nester, Is CATV Infringing Proprietary Rights in Television Broadcasts?, 15
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 153, 166–67 (1965) (assessing CATV’s potential liability
through comparison to the copyright-radio litigations).
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television (“CATV”) as it was known at the time—functioned by
erecting large cooperative antennas capable of receiving distant
broadcast signals, capturing those signals and transmitting them, via
coaxial cables, to the home televisions of each subscriber.62 The
copyright holders to several motion pictures brought suit alleging that
the CATV systems were infringing their exclusive right of public
performance.63
In a surprising departure from the Court’s earlier holding about radio
retransmissions in Buck, the Court held that the activity that the CATV
systems engaged in did not constitute a performance as contemplated
under the 1909 Act.64 The Court rejected the court of appeals’ logic,
based on Buck, that the relevant question was how much the alleged
infringer did to bring about the hearing or viewing of the copyrighted
work and adopted its own function-oriented analysis.65 The Court drew
a bright-line distinction between broadcasters and viewers, noting that it
is the broadcaster who selects, procures, and transmits the program to be
viewed, while the viewer merely receives the transmission and
reconverts it to sound and image.66 This distinction led the Court to
conclude that the broadcaster was the active performer, while the viewer

62. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (describing CATV system configurations at issue in the
Fortnightly litigation).
63. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 393; see Recent Cases, Copyrights—Radio and Television—Cable
Television Operator Subject to Liability for Copyright Infringement When Distant Signals Are
Imported, 87 HARV. L. REV. 665, 666 (1974) (noting that the copyright “owners had claimed that
Fortnightly’s operation of cable systems which enabled subscribers to receive programs which
were otherwise unavailable due to mountainous terrain infringed the owners’ exclusive rights
under the Copyright Act ‘to play or perform’ the copyrighted programs publicly” (footnotes
omitted)).
64. Compare Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395 (holding that CATV retransmissions were not a
public performance), with Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (holding
that radio retransmissions resulted in a public performance).
65. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396 (“The Court of Appeals thought that the controlling question
in deciding whether the petitioner’s CATV systems ‘performed’ the copyrighted works was:
‘[H]ow much did the [petitioner] do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted
work?’” (alterations in the original)); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127,
133 (3d Cir.1974), aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (discussing the Fortnightly Court’s rejection of the
Buck quantitative test in determining whether a performance had occurred and the adoption of a
functional standard).
66. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397. This analytical lens—determining who “performed”—
would have a revival with the advent of digital and automated systems. See, e.g., Cartoon
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing who
“performed” when an automated RS-DVR system housed with the cable provider initiated a
recording at the subscriber’s command).
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was merely a passive beneficiary.67 With this distinction in mind, the
Court found that the CATV systems fell on the viewer side of the
broadcaster-viewer divide because their equipment functioned similarly
to that of the ordinary television viewer, if only more powerfully.68
The Court went on to confirm its Fortnightly conception of a
performance, as it pertained to cable television systems, in
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.69 There the
Court held that it did not convert a CATV system’s activities into a
performance under Fortnightly even if it began retransmitting programs
that would otherwise be unavailable (via analog broadcast) to a
subscriber.70 However, the Court sidestepped the issue of how CATV
did not engage in a broadcaster-type function by choosing to import
programs not otherwise available; it declared only that, for copyright
purposes, such an activity did not alter cable television’s function.71
Thus, after over a half-century of interpreting the 1909 Act’s public
performance right, the Court found itself in the position where a
retransmission of a radio broadcast constituted an infringing
performance (Buck);72 yet, the retransmission of television broadcast
programs over coaxial cable, did not (Fortnightly and Teleprompter).73
Finally, the Court was forced to confront the disparate Fortnightly and

67. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397 (“Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.” (citations
omitted)). The Court cited Buck v. Debaum, a district court case in which that court indicated
“[o]ne who manually or by human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby
inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within
hearing, does not ‘perform’ within the meaning of the Copyright Law.” Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at
398 n.24 (quoting Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929)).
68. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
69. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), superseded by
statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S.
Ct. 2498 (2014); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 84 (“[T]he Supreme Court, in [Teleprompter]
extended the holding of its Fortnightly decision . . . .”).
70. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408 (“By importing signals that could not normally be received
with current technology in the community it serves, a CATV system does not, for copyright
purposes, alter the function it performs for its subscribers . . . .”); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.8.1 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that in Teleprompter “the Court reached
the same result as it did in Fortnightly even though the cable system’s activities . . . made it look
more like a broadcaster”).
71. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 407; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 885 (discussing how
Teleprompter recasts Fortnightly “in circular, legal terms”).
72. See supra Part I.B (discussing Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.).
73. Compare Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395 (CATV transmissions are not a public
performance), and Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408 (extending the Fortnightly decision and
reconfirming that CATV retransmissions are not to the public), with Buck v. Jewell-La Salle
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (holding that radio retransmissions resulted in a public
performance).
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Buck standards in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.74
In Aiken, copyright holders sued the owner of a restaurant for
infringing their public performance rights when he would play
copyrighted music received on a radio throughout his restaurant using
speakers.75 The district court had ruled in favor of the copyright holders
following Buck,76 and the Third Circuit reversed in favor of the
restaurant owner following Fortnightly.77
The Supreme Court
expressed concern about overruling its recent Fortnightly and
Teleprompter decisions, so it decided to limit Buck to its particular facts
and follow the functional test of Fortnightly when it held that the
restaurant owner had not engaged in a performance.78 Also present in
the Court’s decision was a concern for the inequitable result that would
arise if “listeners” were subject to liability for infringement, finding
such an expansion of protection to the rights holders to go beyond what
was required to ensure them adequate compensation.79
Therefore, by the end of 1975, the Court had adopted and reaffirmed

74. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101–810 (2012); see Stadler, supra note 51, at 721 (noting that in Aiken the Court “confirmed the
shift” from Buck’s conception of public performance to that espoused in Fortnightly).
75. 422 U.S. at 152; see Stadler, supra note 51, at 721 (“[T]he proprietor of George Aiken’s
Chicken . . . was sued for playing the radio through ‘four speakers in the ceiling’ of his
restaurant.”).
76. Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 274–75 (W.D. Pa 1973),
rev’d, 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). The district court noted that a
strict following of the Fortnightly logic would lead to a result stating no performance occurred,
but because the Court did not overturn Buck in Fortnightly, the district court followed the
precedent in Buck. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. at 274–75.
77. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 137 (3d Cir. 1974), aff’d, 422
U.S. 151 (1975) (following the functional test set forth in Fortnightly and holding that the
function of the restaurant owner was to extend the “range of audibility” and did not constitute a
separate performance).
78. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 160–62. The Court was also concerned about the public interest and
wrote that the limited scope of copyright “reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” Id.
at 156; see Stadler, supra note 51, at 721–22 (discussing the Court’s decision in Aiken as a “fight
about philosophy” and that in Aiken the Court took a “utilitarian view”).
79. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162–63 (commenting that “[t]he exaction of such multiple tribute
would go far beyond what is required for the economic protection of the copyright owners, and
would be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional purpose behind” the public performance
right (footnote omitted)). The Court here was wrestling with the dual principles of the
Constitution’s copyright clause, protecting copyright holders and promoting the public interest by
not extending such protections too far. See Stadler, supra note 51, at 721–22 (describing the
Court’s concern “that a multiplicity of royalties . . . was unnecessary to encourage creation”);
supra Part I.A (discussing the paired goals of the Constitution’s aims for providing protections
for authors and encouraging inventors).
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an analysis to determine whether a possible infringing performance had
occurred which focused on the function that new technological
developments were performing.80 Cable television providers functioned
as viewers and could not be said to perform, because they lacked the
selection and control over programming broadcasters had; likewise, a
restaurant owner who played music to his customers over the radio
functioned as a listener, merely extending the audibility of an existing
performance.81 However, Congress would soon disagree.82
C. The Copyright Act of 1976
As Supreme Court precedent interpreting the 1909 Act grew, so too
did calls for major reform.83 One of the foremost sources of this plea
for reform was Congress’s recognition of tremendous developments in
technology that had occurred since 1909 and how they affected the
operation of copyright law.84 Of particular concern for Congress, and
subject to reform efforts beginning in the 1960s, was the growing
prevalence of cable television, coupled with the Supreme Court’s

80. See 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 883–87 (discussing the Court’s evolution in interpreting
the 1909 Act and the development of the Fortnightly analysis); Stadler, supra note 51, at 722–23
(noting that “by 1975, the law seemed to side with the utilitarians” by embracing a view of
copyright protection as a balance of interests and rejecting the dissents’ view in Fortnightly and
Aiken that Congress intended to give rights holders “the right to capture the value they had
created— not some of it, but all of it” (emphasis added)).
81. Compare Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (finding that CATV providers fell on the viewer side of the
broadcaster viewer line), and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394,
408 (1974), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (confirming that the distance of the
retransmission does not convert the CATV system to a broadcaster-performer), with Aiken, 422
U.S. at 161–63 (holding that the restaurant proprietor did not perform under the 1909 Act when
he played music throughout his restaurant).
82. See Stadler, supra note 51, at 723 (“[E]verything changed by the end of 1976, when
Congress enacted the new Copyright Act.”); infra Part I.C (discussing the legislative intent
behind the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976).
83. See DAVIES, supra note 2, § 5-007 (discussing the reform efforts culminating in the
Copyright Act of 1976); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 888–95 (discussing the preliminary efforts
and drafts for reforming the 1909 Act).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976) (“During the past half century a wide range of new
techniques for capturing and communicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds
have come into use, and the increasing use of information storage and retrieval devices,
communications satellites, and laser technology promises even greater changes in the near
future. . . . [A]nd the business relations between authors and users have evolved new patterns.”);
DAVIES, supra note 2, §§ 5-007 to 5-008 (discussing the influence of technological developments
and the push for copyright reform).

DYKSTRA PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Weighing Down the Cloud

4/27/2015 2:41 PM

1005

decisions that held that these systems were not engaging in infringing
performances and thus did not need to compensate copyright holders.85
It was in part from these concerns that Congress drafted the
Copyright Act of 1976.86 The Copyright Act sets out six exclusive
rights—including the public performance right—that are guaranteed to
copyright holders.87 Pursuant to the Copyright Act, performing or
displaying a work “publicly” is defined as follows:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.88

While the first clause is essentially a plain meaning definition of
public performance, it is the second clause, the “Transmit Clause,” that
provided a new definition of performance, departing from the
Fortnightly, Teleprompter, and Aiken definitions of the right.89 Thus,
under this new statutory definition, something is a public performance if
it occurs in a place open to the public, a non-public place where the

85. See H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 88–89 (noting the rapid growth of cable systems, their
expected revenue of $770 million in 1975, and how the Supreme Court’s Fortnightly and
Teleprompter decisions prevented broadcast television producers from collecting copyright
royalties from the cable television industry’s retransmission of their programs yet “urged the
Congress . . . to consider and determine the scope and extent of such liability in the pending
revision bill”); see also REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 60, at ix–x
(describing developments in copyright law and reform efforts that would lead to the 1976 Act).
86. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012); see Stadler, supra note 51, at 723 (describing how
Congress rejected the cable television cases handed down by the Supreme Court when, in the
Copyright Act “Congress defined ‘performance’ broadly, explicitly stating that a multiplicity of
royalties was no more than copyright owners were due” (footnote omitted)). This represents a
departure from what Professor Stadler called the “utilitarian” approach of Fortnightly and
Teleprompter, which emphasized balancing the copyright holders protections with the public
interest. Id. at 721–23.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The exclusive rights are: the right to reproduce; the right to prepare
derivative works; the right to distribute copies to the public; the right to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; the right to display the copyrighted work publicly; and “in the case of sound
recordings, [the right] to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.” Id.
88. Id. § 101.
89. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014) (discussing
how Congress rejected the Fortnightly and Teleprompter holdings in the Copyright Act of 1976);
2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 886 (discussing how Congress reversed Fortnightly, Teleprompter,
and Aiken with the 1976 Act).
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public is gathered, or when a performance is transmitted to individual
members of the public, regardless of how many people actually receive
the transmission or whether the recipients are in separate places.90 The
legislative history made clear that the intent behind the new clause was
to fashion a standard broad enough to tackle the challenges presented by
new technologies to copyright law (such as CATV systems) and that the
Supreme Court had so far allowed to escape liability.91
Further evidence of Congress’s intent to protect broadcast television
from the activities of cable television systems was the inclusion into the
Copyright Act of section 111.92 This section instituted a compulsory
license scheme, similar to the one created by the 1909 Act for piano
rolls,93 for qualified secondary transmissions of a primary transmission
that embodied a performance of a copyrighted work.94 In relevant part,
the section defined a primary transmission as a “transmission made to
the public by a transmitting facility whose signals are being received . . .
regardless of where or when the performance or display was first
transmitted” and a secondary transmission as “the further transmitting
of a primary transmission simultaneously with the primary
transmission.”95 The significance of these twin definitions was to bring
90. See HALPERN, supra note 13, § 1.06[D] (discussing the Transmit Clause in terms of the
public performance right); MARY LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 7.5 (2008)
(discussing how the Transmit Clause changed the public performance right).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) (“Under the definitions of ‘perform,’ ‘display,’
‘publicly,’ and ‘transmit’ in section 101, the concepts of public performance and public display
cover not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or
showing is transmitted or communicated to the public”); see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 895
(noting that “[c]able television issues dominated hearings held in the House in 1975” in the lead
up to the passage of the new copyright act).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 111; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 939–40 (“The basic concept underpinning
Section 111 is that contrary to the Supreme Court’s Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions,
cable operators and others . . . who retransmit copyrighted works are engaging in a
performance.”).
93. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Copyright Act of 1909 and the compulsory license for
piano roll technology); see also 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 59 (discussing White-Smith and the
addition of the compulsory license).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c). The statute states:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection and section
114(d), secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a performance or
display of a work embodied in a primary transmission made by a broadcast station
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission or by an appropriate
governmental authority of Canada or Mexico shall be subject to statutory licensing
upon compliance with the requirements of subsection (d) where the carriage of the
signals comprising the secondary transmission is permissible under the rules,
regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.
Id.
95. Id. § 111(f)(1)–(2); see Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 400–
01 (8th Cir. 1985) (commenting that, under section 111 a broadcast “signal is a ‘primary
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within the compulsory license the simultaneous retransmission of
broadcast television being performed by cable television providers.96
Moreover, under section 111(c), such transmissions are to the public
and potentially actionable as infringing public performances.97
Therefore, to protect the broadcast television producers, those
transmissions subject to section 111—that is, the retransmissions by
cable television—were required to pay licensing fees to the broadcast
provider whose content they were retransmitting.98
D. The Transmit Clause and RS-DVRs: A Prelude to Aereo
As hinted at above, amending copyright law to address issues
presented by today’s technologies leaves open the door for tomorrow’s
innovations to exploit unforeseen ambiguities, and the same is true of
Given how cable television and radio
the Transmit Clause.99
transmissions functioned at the time, an ambiguity in the text of the
Transmit Clause was not exposed until the advent of another
technology: the RS-DVR.100 RS-DVRs allow subscribers to record a
transmission,’ . . . [and] that its retransmission by cable systems is a ‘secondary transmission to
the public’” (citation omitted)); Aaron M. Cooper, Mass Media Mess: The Optimistic
Deregulatory Goals of the “Next Generation Television Marketplace Act,” 23 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 206 n.19 (2012) (noting that under section 111 “[a] primary
broadcaster broadcasts directly to viewers (such as a local station does) while a secondary
broadcaster must first pick up a signal from a primary broadcaster before retransmitting that
signal to viewers (such as most cable and satellite companies do)”).
96. 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 940 (“The effect of these definitions is to limit the compulsory
license to simultaneous retransmissions of broadcast programing: the license does not generally
cover off-the-air taping of broadcast programming, delayed retransmissions, or cable-originated
programming.” (footnotes omitted)); see HALPERN, supra note 13, § 1.06[D][h][i] (discussing the
compulsory license and its effect for cable television’s retransmission of primary transmissions).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c); see LAFRANCE, supra note 90, § 8.4 (discussing how section 111
attaches liability to cable television’s retransmissions); see 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 7.8.2.2
(discussing the compulsory license for cable television under the Copyright Act of 1976).
98. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 7.8.2.2 (discussing how cable television’s
simultaneous secondary transmissions are subject to the statutory licensing structure of section
111); 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 956 (outlining the licensing schedule that the cable systems are
subject to). See generally NIMMER, supra note 37, § 8.18 (discussing the doctrine of secondary
transmissions and the development of the compulsory license scheme in the Copyright Act of
1976).
99. See McBride, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that new technologies are attempting to exploit a
“loophole” within the Transmit Clause created by the courts); see also supra Part I.A–C
(reviewing how new technologies—radio and cable television—attempted to avoid liability from
copyright laws written prior to their invention).
100. Compare Fortnightly Corp v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (describing CATV systems as capturing a single broadcast and
then distributing it to its subscribers), and Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 195
(1931) (describing the functioning of the radio in terms of a single copy transmission that was
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copy of a television program, which is stored at a cable company’s
facilities, and then, on request, play the program using the stored
copy.101 The critical feature of RS-DVR technology is its use of
multiple discrete copies, each being transmitted to individual
subscribers and not, as with previous technologies, merely transmitting
one copy to all subscribers.102 Therefore, to determine if a copyright
holder’s exclusive public performance right was infringed, it became
necessary to interpret whether the Transmit Clause meant that a court
should look to the potential audience of the particular transmission
played from a unique copy, or, conversely, the potential audience of the
underlying performance, aggregated from all the separate
transmissions.103
The Second Circuit did so in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc. (“Cablevision”).104 Cablevision began by looking to the text and
legislative history of the Copyright Act, and found that in both, a
transmission is itself a type of performance.105 Because the Second
later picked up and retransmitted by the hotel), with Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
536 F.3d 121, 124 (2008) (highlighting how RS-DVRs involve multiple transmissions of the
same underlying work from separate copies).
101. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124 (describing Cablevision’s RS-DVR technology);
Marc Miller, Comment, Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585,
588 (2010) (describing Cablevision’s technology as well, but noting however, that “[a]bsent any
recording requests from the individual subscribers, data . . . is never permanently captured by the
RS-DVR”).
102. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 135 (discussing how RS-DVR technology functions);
Daniel Brenner, “Gently Down the Stream”: When Is An Online Performance Public Under
Copyright?, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1167, 1181 (2013) (“The use of a single copy for each
performance in Cablevision rather than reusing one copy for performances from a single copy
was critical to the decision and the precedent it created.”).
103. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 135 (discussing this question); Giblin & Ginsburg,
supra note 17, at 11 (“[The interpretation of the Transmit Clause] has been the subject of a great
deal of controversy, stemming largely from a perceived grammatical ambiguity within the text.
By stating that ‘[t]o perform . . . a work “publicly” means . . . to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public’, the statute defines the act of
transmitting a performance as one type of performing, even though the terms ‘to perform’ and ‘to
transmit’ are separately defined as well. This creates uncertainty as to whether the relevant
performance is the performance created by the act of the transmission . . . or the performance of
the underlying work . . . .”).
104. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); see Carrie Bodner, Master Copies, Unique Copies and
Volitional Conduct: Cartoon Network’s Implications for the Liability of Cyber Lockers, 36
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 491, 493 (2013) (describing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Cablevision as
“influential”); Thomas M. Cramer, Comment, The Copyright Act and the Frontier of
“Television”: What to Do About Aereo, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 104 (2014)
(characterizing Cablevision as “[t]he next significant case” interpreting the Transmit Clause).
105. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To perform . . .
‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . .”); see H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 64–65 (1976) (“Under the bill . . . a performance made available by transmission
to the public at large is ‘public’ even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place. . . .
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Circuit concluded that the Copyright Act defined a transmission as a
performance, and that the Transmit Clause refers to whether the public
is capable of “receiving the performance”—as opposed to the receiving
the particular work—the court interpreted the clause to mean that it
should look to the potential audience of the particular transmission (the
transmission-performance) to see if a public performance occurred.106
The Second Circuit bolstered its interpretation by reasoning that RSDVR transmissions may not be made without a copy of the work, which
in turn allows an injured copyright holder to seek redress both for the
infringing performance and for the unauthorized reproduction.107
Therefore, because the two rights reinforce each other by providing
protection under one right if the other failed, the Second Circuit
determined that it was consistent with the Act to look to both the
identity of the transmitter, and whether the same copy is being used in
determining whether a transmission was to the public.108 Thus, in the
Second Circuit’s view, transmissions of the same underlying work made
from a single copy are fundamentally different from transmissions of
the same underlying work made from different copies.109 With this
interpretation in hand, the court held that RS-DVRs did not infringe the
public performance right because each transmission-copy was
transmitted to only one subscriber, and thus, not to the public.110
The Second Circuit would follow this reasoning in its decision in the
Aereo litigation.111 However, even before the Supreme Court’s

The same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of the transmission represent a
limited segment of the public . . . .”); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing the
Transmit Clause and the ambiguity over whether the relevant focus is the particular transmission
or the underlying work itself).
106. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137.
107. Id. at 138 (“[T]he right of reproduction can reinforce and protect the right of public
performance.”); see Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 538 (2010) (“[P]erformances of audiovisual works
cannot be transmitted at all unless the transmitter has obtained copies of them.”).
108. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138 (“Given this interplay between the various rights . . . it
seems quite consistent with the Act to treat a transmission made using Copy A as distinct from
one made using Copy B, just as we would treat a transmission made by Cablevision as distinct
from . . . [a] transmission made by Comcast”).
109. Id.; see NIMMER, supra note 37, § 8.14[C][3][a] (analyzing the meaning of the “at
separate times” language of Transmit Clause, Professor Nimmer notes “[u]pon reflection, it
would seem that what must have been intended was that if the same copy (or phonorecord) of a
given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different members of the public, albeit at
different times, the result is a ‘public’ performance”).
110. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137.
111. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (comparing Aereo to Cablevision’s RS-DVR technology); see infra Part II.B (discussing
the lower courts’ rulings during the Aereo litigation).
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decision in Aereo, other courts disagreed with this interpretation and
instead looked to Congress’s intent in the Copyright Act to ensure a
commercial enterprise that profited from carrying copyrighted material
did not do so without remunerating copyright holders with appropriate
compensation.112
E. Interpretive Questions and Determining Who is Liable
A set of legal issues that developed as a confluence between
copyright law and new technologies were the interrelated questions of
who is performing the infringing activity, and how to assign liability
when the activities of two or more individuals combine to create the
infringing act.113 These issues cut across many of the rights granted
under the Copyright Act, including reproduction and public
performance rights.114 Courts have consequently developed alternative
theories of liability (secondary liability or contributory infringement)115
and modes of analysis (volitional act test).116
112. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48 (D.D.C.
2013) (“This system, through which any member of the public who clicks on the link for the
video feed, is hardly akin to an individual user stringing up a television antenna on the roof.”);
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting, while interpreting the Transmit Clause, that “Congress found that ‘cable
systems are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the
carriage of copyrighted program material and . . . copyright royalties should be paid by cable
operators to the creators of such programs’” (citation omitted)); see supra Part I.C (discussing the
compulsory license for cable television retransmissions).
113. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 8.0 (discussing the growing importance of secondary
liability for copyright holders as more content becomes digitized and subject to automated
systems while at the same time reducing the effectiveness of going after the direct infringers);
LAFRANCE, supra note 90, § 9.4, at 277 (recognizing “[c]oncepts of secondary liability for
copyright infringement are well-established in the case law, even though they are not expressly
recognized in the copyright statutes. . . . [Secondary liability theories] permit a defendant to be
found liable for infringement even though the defendant did not personally engage in one of the
infringing activities” described in section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976).
114. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 (noting that there is an unresolved question as to
whether Cablevision or the subscriber “performs,” but assumes for its decision that Cablevision is
the one performing). See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (discussing whether the manufacturer of video tape recorders could be liable if its
customers used the device to make infringing reproductions of television shows).
115. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 8.0 (reviewing the theories of contributory
infringement and vicarious liability that have been developed). Professor Goldstein also noted
how digital technologies have shifted the performance and selection of protected works away
from public places and into private homes, which in turn leads to “diminishing returns from the
pursuit of direct infringers” and causes copyright holders to “increasingly turn[] to theories of
secondary liability . . . to stem their losses.” Id. § 8:2; see 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 1147–51
(reviewing theories of contributory infringement).
116. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 7.0.2, at 7:4 to 7:5 (stating that “[t]he copyright
principle of strict liability presents a particular doctrinal challenge in an electronic environment
where the servers of a single Internet service provider may automatically reproduce, perform and
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Secondary liability is the inducing or facilitating of infringing
conduct by someone else.117 One of the first technologies to broach
these issues after the passage of the Copyright Act was video tape
recorders (“VTR”), which allowed consumers to record and re-watch
programs received on their television sets.118 In the litigation arising
out of VTR technology, copyright holders claimed that the VTR
manufacturer was liable for contributing to the actual, or “direct,”
infringing that consumers engaged in by copying protected works.119
Prior Supreme Court precedent had recognized a form of liability in
contributing to the infringing activity of another and lower courts had
routinely found liability where an ongoing relationship existed between
the contributor and the infringer.120 However, the only relationship
between the VTR manufacturer and the consumer was at the point of
sale, and if liability were to be found, the Supreme Court found it must
be because the manufacturer sold the product with constructive
knowledge that the VTR would be used for infringing purposes.121
display uncounted millions of copyrighted works in a single day” and that because of this, courts
have required “an element of ‘volition or causation’ . . . before liability is imposed”); 2 PATRY,
supra note 21, § 9:5.50 (reviewing the volitional act requirements and cases that have applied it).
117. See Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845–47 (11th
Cir. 1990) (discussing whether an individual is liable for contributory infringement when he
directed others to make copies of a copyrighted computer program); Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[O]ne who, with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” (footnote omitted)).
118. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420 (describing VTR technology); Edward Alan Jeffords,
Comment, Home Audio Recording After Betamax: Taking A Fresh Look, 36 BAYLOR L. REV.
855, 856–57 (1984) (discussing the Sony litigation and VTR technology).
119. Sony, 464 U.S at 420.
120. For the case in which Justice Holmes coined the term “contributory liability,” see Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (holding that a company that made an unauthorized
film dramatization of Ben Hur was liable for the unauthorized public performances put on by
those to whom they sold the dramatization). For a sampling of the lower courts finding
contributory infringement in circumstances of an ongoing relationship, see Famous Music Corp.
v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass’n, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding
racetrack liable for unauthorized public performances by independent contractor-singers it had
hired); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee’s Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (finding
lounge owner liable for infringing performance of musicians he hired to perform, even when
owner had no direct knowledge of which songs were to be performed). This is in contrast to
cases where courts found no ongoing relationship. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686
(1938) (finding no liability for owner who rented premise after lessees used premise for
infringing purpose).
121. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (“If vicarious liability is to be imposed on [petitioners] in this case,
it must rest on the fact that [they] ha[ve] sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact
that [their] customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material.”). As has been noted about traditional contributory infringement theories:
[They] had grown out of cases involving a continuing relationship between the
infringer and the contributor, or situations in which the contributor had provided the
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Borrowing from theories found in patent law and trying to strike a
balance between the copyright holder’s need for protection and the
public’s interest in gaining access to legitimate innovations, the Court
found that there could be no contributory infringement if the product
had substantial, non-infringing uses.122 In the context of VTR
technology, the Court found, using a copyright law theory known as
“fair use,” that private, noncommercial time-shifting (i.e., recording a
program for later viewing) was a substantial non-infringing use.123
Additionally, another context in which the courts have had to address
theories of contributory infringement has been with infringement over
the Internet; perhaps most well known in the context of peer-to-peer file
sharing technologies.124 Like with VTR technology, copyright holders
alleged that the developer of the technology should be liable for users’
infringing file sharing.125 The Court admitted that non-infringing uses

infringer with the infringing work. [This] led the courts to focus on the issue of
whether the defendants actually encouraged or controlled the infringers. The doctrine
did not speak to cases in which the only interaction between the contributor and the
infringer occurred at the point of sale of a machine later put to an infringing use.
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 289 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
122. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.”). The Patent Act, unlike the Copyright Act, actually includes a provision
that states “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012). Utilizing the patent theories that have developed from this provision,
the Court in Sony noted:
[I]n contributory infringement cases arising under the patent laws the Court has always
recognized the critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his monopoly
beyond the limits of his specific grant. These cases deny the patentee any right to
control the distribution of unpatented articles unless they are “unsuited for any
commercial noninfringing use.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198
(1980)).
123. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (“For one potential use of the [VTR] plainly satisfies this standard,
however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home”). A discussion of
the fair use doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note, but the Copyright Act of 1976 sets out the
doctrine as: “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012). For discussions on the
development of the fair use doctrine, see, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 2, §§ 5-028 to 5-034;
NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05; 2 PATRY, supra note 21, §§ 10:1 to 10:160.
124. See Daniel Gross, Does a Free Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/21/business/yourmoney/21view.html?ex=1258693200&
en=a210357f5dcc8523&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&_r=0 (discussing the rise of Napster and Kazaa
and the concurrent plunge in record sales by thirty-one percent).
125. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–21
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of peer-to-peer sharing were possible, but nevertheless found the
software developer liable for contributory infringement, because the
purpose and intent behind the software were so obviously attempts to
encourage infringing activity by the consumers.126
As technology has increasingly become more automated, many lower
courts have also adopted a volitional act test before holding an entity
directly liable for copyright infringement.127 Particularly in the context
of the Internet, where service providers have little control over the
activities of their users on systems that are largely automated, courts
have expressed concern that if they were to find service providers
directly liable for users’ copying done through the service providers’
hardware, they “would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that
cannot reasonably be deterred.”128 As a result of this concern, many
courts look to whether any volitional act on the part of the service
provider or equipment provider caused the infringing use. For example,
in the Cablevision litigation, the Second Circuit looked to whether the
cable company providing the RS-DVR engaged in any volitional act
(i.e., actively participated), when allegedly infringing reproductions
were made at its subscribers’ requests, to determine if the cable provider
was directly liable; finding no volitional act, the court moved on to
discuss whether there was a public performance.129

(2005) (noting that Grokster was being sued for “knowingly and intentionally distribut[ing] their
software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the
Copyright Act”), with Sony, 464 U.S. at 420 (noting that the plaintiffs “maintained that [Sony]
w[as] liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by Betamax consumers because
of petitioners’ marketing of the Betamax VTR’s”).
126. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941 (“Here, evidence of the distributors’ words and deeds
going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of
copyright infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on
the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a patently illegal objective from
statements and actions showing what that objective was.”).
127. See, e.g., Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
that the DVR provider had not directly infringed when subscribers used its service to initiate
potentially infringing reproductions); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an Internet access provider was not
directly liable when its system copied protected works placed on its server by users). To an
extent, these concerns are part of the ongoing debate over protecting authors and inventors while
not depriving the public of access to new and innovative technologies. See supra Part I.A
(discussing the underlying goal of the Constitution’s allowance for copyright protections).
128. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1372. But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding an operator of a subscription computer billboard
directly liable for unauthorized displays of protected works uploaded by the billboards users and
noting that “[i]ntent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent
infringer is liable for infringement”).
129. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In
determining who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant difference exists between making a
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All of the issues discussed above—including single versus separate
copy transmissions, direct and secondary/contributory infringement, and
the volitional act test—were central to the copyright litigation brought
against Aereo that the Court decided in the summer of 2014.
II. DISCUSSION
This Part discusses how the Supreme Court determined copyright
liability for the Internet-based television-streaming service Aereo, Inc.,
under the Transmit Clause in the recent case American Broadcasting
Companies v. Aereo, Inc.130 First, this Part outlines the facts of
Aereo.131 Second, this Part discusses the procedural history of the
litigation, focusing on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
Transmit Clause.132 Finally, this Part discusses the parties’ arguments
as well as the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in depth.133
A. Aereo’s Technical Architecture and Case Facts
Aereo, Inc. launched in February 2012 as an Internet-based television
company offering a subscription service that enabled subscribers to
watch local broadcast television over their Internet-connected devices
for $12 dollars per month.134 Aereo provided its subscribers with
access to two pieces of equipment: an antenna and a digital video

request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the
copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and
engages in no volitional conduct.”); see LAFRANCE, supra note 90, § 9.5 (discussing the
volitional act test and theories of secondary liability in the context of Internet service providers).
130. 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
131. See infra Part II.A (reviewing the pertinent facts of the Aereo litigation and focusing on
the technological architecture of Aereo’s service).
132. See infra Part II.B (discussing the procedural history of the litigation with a particular
emphasis on the Second Circuit’s decision).
133. See infra Part II.C (discussing the parties’ arguments and the majority and dissenting
opinions, focusing on the perceived effect the decision could have on cloud computing).
134. Brief for Respondent at 9, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461); see Brian Stelter, New Service Will Stream Local TV Stations in New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/newservice-will-stream-local-tv-stations-in-new-york/?smid=tw-nytimestv&seid=auto (discussing the
introduction of Aereo to New York and its features). One interesting fact is the head executive of
Aereo also helped create the Fox television network over thirty years ago. Id. Aereo’s own
description of its technology, other than what is preserved in its briefs for the case, is currently
unavailable via its website. After the Court’s ruling in June, visitors to the website are greeted by
a letter which states: “The U.S. Supreme Court decision effectively changed the laws that had
governed Aereo’s technology, creating regulatory and legal uncertainty. And while our team has
focused its energies on exploring every path forward available to us, without that clarity, the
challenges have proven too difficult to overcome.” Chet Kanojia, A Letter to Our Consumers,
AEREO (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.aereo.com/.
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recorder (“DVR”).135 Similar to the Cablevision litigation, the key
feature of Aereo’s DVRs was that they were located at Aereo facilities
and accessible remotely, in a cloud-service arrangement.136 Thus,
unlike traditional DVR or antenna arrangements that are wired directly
to a consumer’s television set, Aereo’s service involved the
transmission of content from Aereo to the subscriber.137 Whenever a
subscriber wanted to watch a program, he or she was assigned a unique
antenna, and so even if multiple subscribers decided to watch the same
program, they each received the broadcast from their own antenna.138
Upon logging in to their account, a subscriber would be presented
with a guide listing channels available in her broadcast market.139 At

135. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he RS–DVR allows Cablevision customers who do not have a stand-alone DVR to record
cable programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by Cablevision at a ‘remote’
location.”); Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 9 (“Aereo’s equipment differs from
traditional antennas and DVRs in that it is remotely located and accessible via the Internet
‘cloud,’ rather than located in the user’s home.”). What distinguishes Aereo’s service from
Cablevision’s DVRs is Aereo’s offering of access to live television without a Cable TV-style
licensing agreement with the broadcasters to retransmit their programs under section 111 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 33, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States] (“In Cablevision, the cable company already possessed
the necessary licenses to transmit copyrighted television programs to its subscribers. The RSDVR system simply allowed subscribers to engage in ‘time shifting’ by recording, for later
viewing, programs they received through their authorized cable subscriptions.”).
136. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 9. For a definition and description of cloud
technology, see THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING, supra note 19, at 2 (providing the
National Institute of Science & Technology’s definition of cloud computing). In fact, Aereo even
characterizes itself as a cloud computing business; in its brief Aereo stated, “[l]ike other ‘cloud
computing’ companies, Aereo capitalizes on widespread access to high-speed Internet
connections.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 9.
137. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 573 U.S. —,
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (“Aereo transmits to its subscribers broadcast television programs over the
internet for a monthly subscription fee.”); see Brief for Petitioners at 7, Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (characterizing Aereo as a
broadcast television retransmission service that transmits public performances from Aereo to the
subscriber).
138. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 10 (“The user’s selection of a program
activates and tunes an antenna assigned solely to that user, which picks up the signal from the
local station broadcasting the program.”); Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 6–7
(describing how each subscriber is given access to an antenna for his or her individual use).
139. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 10. Aereo apparently went to great lengths to
limit the broadcast channels available via its service, likely to avoid other copyright issues; in its
brief Aereo notes:
Aereo imposes several geographic controls to ensure consumers can make and access
their recordings only when they are physically located within the original broadcast
area. Those include: confirming a home address within the market through credit card
checks; IP address verification; further checks using GPS, cell tower triangulation, and
other methods; and reminders that Aereo’s Terms of Use prohibit attempting to access
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this point a subscriber could choose to “Record” a program airing on an
available channel to watch later, or “Watch” a program nearly live.140
The “Watch” feature was “nearly live” because the program was briefly
delayed while Aereo’s system created a user specific copy and then
transmitted that copy to the subscriber.141 For either the “Record” or
“Watch” functions, however, Aereo’s system remained dormant until
commands were relayed to it from the subscriber.142 Furthermore,
throughout the process, from when the subscriber’s antenna tuned to the
selected broadcast, the user copy was saved, and when the copy was
transmitted to the consumer, the specific data transmitted was only
available to the one subscriber.143 The effect of this design, and what
led the plaintiffs to call Aereo’s system a gimmick, was that if 10,000
subscribers wanted to watch the same program, 10,000 different
antenna-DVR combinations would individually receive the broadcast
and make 10,000 copies, which were then transmitted to the users via
10,000 separate transmissions.144 Nonetheless, Aereo offered this
service without paying the copyright holders who owned the broadcast
television programs Aereo allowed its subscribers to access.145

a recording outside the original broadcast area.
Id. at 9 n.6 (citations omitted); see Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 6 (noting that
Aereo only offered programs available in a subscriber’s local broadcast market).
140. See WNET, 712 F.3d at 681 (“Thus the user can watch the program nearly live, that is,
almost contemporaneously with the over-the-air-broadcast.”); Brief for Respondent, supra note
134, at 10 (describing the different “Watch” and “Record” functions Aereo offered); Brief for the
United States, supra note 135, at 6 (noting these two different functions of Aereo’s service).
141. See WNET, 712 F.3d at 681 n.3 (“The technical operation of Aereo’s system . . . results
in a slight delay in transmitting the program, which means that an Aereo subscriber using the
‘Watch’ feature sees the program delayed by approximately ten seconds.”); Giblin & Ginsburg,
supra note 17, at 4 (noting the “near-live” nature of Aereo’s “Watch” feature).
142. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 10 (“Aereo’s equipment does not receive or
record any broadcast programming except in response to user commands; when not in use by
consumers, it is dormant.”); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 4 (describing how Aereo’s
servers do not initiate a recording until a subscriber inputs a command).
143. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 12 (“From beginning to end, the data received
by an antenna are available only to the individual user.”); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 4
(“[N]o two users are ever assigned the same antenna simultaneously, and recordings made while
an antenna is assigned to a particular user are never available to any other subscriber.”).
144. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (2012) (“Plaintiffs . . .
argu[e] . . . [that] the Court should view Aereo’s system as a technological gimmick . . . .”); Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 1, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(No. 13-461) (deriding, once again, Aereo’s system as a “gimmick” in their reply brief). The
point the copyright holders are arguing is that Aereo’s system was not a technological
advancement, but merely an inefficient workaround to avoid copyright liability. See Giblin &
Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 4–5 (“Viewed in technical isolation, Aereo’s design looks clumsy and
wasteful.”). Professors Giblin and Ginsburg also utilize the 10,000 different subscribers example
to illustrate Aereo’s functionality. Id. at 4.
145. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (noting
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The Aereo plaintiffs were various corporations that held copyrights in
a number of broadcast television programs that Aereo made available
for viewing to its subscriber network.146 The initial lawsuits alleged
several alternative theories of how Aereo infringed the plaintiffs’
copyrights, including infringing the public performance right and the
right of reproduction, and contributory infringement theories for both of
these rights.147 However, the plaintiffs quickly moved for a preliminary
injunction solely on whether Aereo was directly liable for infringing
their public performance right by allowing subscribers to view
copyrighted works simultaneously with the over-the-air broadcasts.148
B. The Lower Courts Follow Cablevision
The District Court for the Southern District of New York’s opinion
was mostly a comparison of Aereo’s service to the RS-DVR system at
issue in Cablevision, which was the controlling precedent for the
court.149 Finding that Aereo functioned remarkably similarly to an RSDVR (both involved remote storage and transmission of protected

that many of the programs Aereo offered were copyrighted and “Aereo neither own[ed] the
copyright in those works nor h[eld] a license from the copyright owners to perform those works
publicly”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 11 (“Aereo believes that [its technological
design] obviates the need to pay copyright holders the compensation legally demanded of its
competitors.”).
146. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375. The plaintiff corporations included American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Disney Enterprises, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., NBC Studios,
LLC, Universal Network Television, LLC, and Telemundo Network Group LLC. Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 137, at ii.
147. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (explaining that Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts multiple
theories of liability, including infringement of the right of public performance, infringement of
the right of reproduction, and contributory infringement); Brief for the United States, supra note
135, at 8 n.3 (“Petitioners’ complaint also alleged that respondent’s non-contemporaneous
transmissions violated their public-performance rights, and further argued that respondent’s
actions violated their exclusive right to reproduce their copyrighted works and constituted
contributory infringement.”).
148. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376. Therefore, as many commentators would point out
Aereo’s liability for possible reproduction or contributory infringement was never addressed. See
Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 5 (“It is [p]etitioners who elected not to pursue the
logical claim that users infringe the reproduction right, and who elected not to develop the
evidence that would bear on fair use or secondary liability.”); Brief for the United States, supra
note 135, at 8 n.3 (“Those additional theories are not involved here because petitioners did not
rely on them in seeking a preliminary injunction.”). The effect of this decision is discussed
further below. See infra Part III (discussing how by proceeding on this limited question the Court
was precluded from looking at the other theories of liability alleged).
149. See Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (comparing Aereo to RS-DVR); Lyle Denniston,
Argument Preview: Free TV, at a Bargain Price?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 19, 2014, 12:08 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/argument-preview-free-tv-at-a-bargain-price/ (noting that
the district court judge found that Aereo “was shielded by the Second Circuit’s 2008 ruling in the
Cablevision case”).
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works at the user’s request), the district court determined that Aereo
made distinct user copies and created its own separate and distinct
performance via transmissions to the subscriber.150 This interpretive
lens permitted the district court to dismiss other cases supporting the
plaintiffs’ position,151 on the grounds that those cases dealt with
transmissions of single “master copies” and not user-specific copies.152
Finding itself bound by Cablevision, the district court denied the
plaintiff copyright holders’ request for a preliminary injunction.153
On appeal, the Second Circuit picked up right where it left off in
Cablevision by focusing on the meaning of the Transmit Clause.154
Under its interpretation, when determining whether a performance is “to
the public,” a court looks to the potential audience of the particular
150. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (“[T]his Court finds that on the key points on which
Cablevision actually relied, Aereo’s system is materially identical to that in Cablevision,
suggesting that the copies Aereo creates are as significant as those created in Cablevision.”
(citation omitted)). At issue here is that the plaintiffs in both Cablevision and Aereo attempted to
cast what the defendants’ technologies were doing as “facilitating the transmission of a single
master copy.” Id. at 385; see Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139
(2008) (discussing whether the RS-DVR likewise involves the transmission of a “single copy of a
given work”). The importance being that if the courts view the technology as the same copy
being performed (or transmitted) to multiple subscribers, such activity easily falls into traditional
concepts of public performance under the Transmit Clause. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (1984) (finding that in the context of a video rental
store that allowed patrons to take the same single copy of a movie and view it in a private booth,
the Third Circuit found “[a]lthough Maxwell’s has only one copy of each film, it shows each
copy repeatedly to different members of the public. This constitutes a public performance”).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that “a download of a musical work does not constitute a public
performance of that work”); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y 2011)
(allowing an injunction for plaintiffs that prevents defendants from streaming plaintiff’s
copyrighted television programming).
152. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (“Such cases, however, have generally not considered the
impact of the creation of unique copies—the focus of Cablevision’s analysis—on whether
internet streaming transmissions involve a public performance and thus did not address the
question currently before the Court.”). For a sampling of the cases the plaintiffs relied on for
their proposition, see, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Composers, 627 F.3d at 74 (finding that “[a] stream is an
electronic transmission that renders the musical work audible as it is received by the clientcomputer’s temporary memory” and that “all parties agree [such stream transmissions] constitute
public performances”); WPIX, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (in the context of unauthorized Internet
streaming of television programs “it is undisputed that they own valid copyrights and that ivi is
making public performances of their works without their consent”).
153. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405. The Court however did express trepidation over
wholeheartedly embracing Aereo’s position, noting “[t]his position would eviscerate the transmit
clause given the ease of making reproductions before transmitting digital data, and Cablevision
does not require such a far sweep.” See id. at 396.
154. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 573 U.S. —,
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); see Denniston, supra note 149 (noting that in the Second Circuit’s Aereo
opinion “[t]he majority relied heavily upon its decision in the Cablevision case”); see also infra
Part I.D (discussing the Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision).
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transmission, not the potential audience of the underlying work.155
Unsurprisingly, the Second Circuit focused on the unique copies created
by Aereo’s system and how each copy was only available to a single
user.156 Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected arguments by the
plaintiffs attempting to distinguish Cablevision from Aereo’s system; in
particular, the court refused to give any weight to the fact that
Cablevision initially obtained a license under the compulsory licensing
regime set out in the Copyright Act for cable providers, whereas Aereo
had not, finding that this had no bearing on whether Cablevision (and
now Aereo) was authorized to retransmit stored copies or whether it was
publically performing via its own transmissions.157
Another argument that the Second Circuit rejected, and that the
Supreme Court ultimately embraced, was the plaintiffs’ argument
regarding the legislative intent behind the Copyright Act.158 The
plaintiffs argued that Congress intended to define a public performance
to include cable television retransmissions, and that Aereo was the
functional equivalent of a cable system, so it too should be liable.159
The Second Circuit, however, found this interpretation of the legislative

155. WNET, 712 F.3d at 687 (returning to its concern that alternative interpretations would be
unworkable, the court noted that “[g]iven that ‘the potential audience for every copyrighted
audiovisual work is the general public,’ [the alternative interpretation] would render the ‘to the
public’ language of the Clause superfluous and contradict the Clause’s obvious contemplation of
non-public transmissions” (quoting Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
135–136 (2nd Cir. 2008))). But see, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content
Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (regarding a technology analogous to
Aereo, and rejecting the Cablevision reasoning, the district court noted “[t]hat is not the only
possible reading of the statute. The definition section sets forth what constitutes a public
performance of a copyrighted work, and says that transmitting a performance to the public is a
public performance. It does not require a ‘performance’ of a performance”).
156. WNET, 712 F.3d at 689.
157. Id. at 690 (“This argument fails, as the question is whether Aereo’s transmissions are
public performances of the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. If so, Aereo needs a license to make
such public performances; if they are not public performances, it needs no such license.”).
Interestingly enough, after the Supreme Court ruled against Aereo, this distinction would be
argued by many as an alternative to the interpretation the Supreme Court gave the Transmit
Clause (discussed infra Part II.C), and that by folding Aereo into the compulsory license,
copyright holders would still be protected. See Stoltz, supra note 23 (noting that the cable
television compulsory license scheme set forth in section 111 of the Copyright Act could be a
viable avenue for Aereo in the wake of the Court’s decision); infra Part III.C (discussing the
compulsory license option as an alternative to the Court’s decision).
158. Compare WNET, 712 F.3d at 694 (noting that the plaintiffs’ “reading of the legislative
history is simply incompatible with the conclusions of the Cablevision court”), with Am. Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (finding that Congress amended
the Act in 1976 “in large part” to overturn the Court’s Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions
and bring cable television’s activities within the public performance definition of the new Act).
159. WNET, 712 F.3d at 694; see infra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of
this issue which tracks the copyright holders view of Congress’s intent).
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history of the Act too narrow, and instead focused on another intent of
Congress, limiting the performance protections to public performances
only.160 Noting that technological developments during the intervening
years had made it more difficult to distinguish between public and
private transmissions, the Second Circuit nonetheless found Aereo not
liable and more closely resembling a private transmission created from
a rooftop antenna into a consumer’s living room than an infringing
CATV-esque public performance.161 Ultimately, it was on these exact
issues that the Supreme Court decided the case: whether Aereo
resembled a cable television system or a private in-home transmission;
and what was the legislative intent behind the Act.162
C. Aereo: Innovator or Cable Television-Redux?
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Aereo there was hope
that its decision would provide clarity for what constituted a public
performance over the Internet.163 Specifically, many were concerned
what a Court decision for the copyright holders would mean for cloud
160. WNET, 712 F.3d at 694–95. The Second Circuit here quoted from the House Report on
the passing of the Act, that under the new definition “any individual is performing whenever he
or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or communicates the performance by
turning on a receiving set.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976). The court went on to note:
But because Congress did not wish to require everyone to obtain a license from
copyright holders before they could “perform” the copyrighted works played by their
television, Congress was careful to note that a performance “would not be actionable as
an infringement unless it were done ‘publicly,’ as defined in section 101.” “Private”
performances are exempted from copyright liability. This limitation also applies to
performances created by a “transmission,” since, as the Cablevision court noted, if
Congress intended all transmissions to be public performances, the Transmit Clause
would not have contained the phrase “to the public.”
WNET, 712 F.3d at 694 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 695 (“New devices such as RS–DVRs and Slingboxes complicate our analysis, as
the transmissions generated by these devices can be analogized to the paradigmatic example of a
‘private’ transmission: that from a personal roof-top antenna to a television set in a living room.
As much as Aereo’s service may resemble a cable system, it also generates transmissions that
closely resemble the private transmissions from these devices.”).
162. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504 (the Court frames the issue presented by Aereo as two
questions: “[f]irst, in operating in the manner described above, does Aereo ‘perform’ at all? And
second, if so, does Aereo do so ‘publicly’?”). In answering these questions the Court looked to
the Copyright Act and the prior CATV litigations, and concluded “read in light of its purpose, the
Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.” Id.; see infra
Part II.C.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s comparison of Aereo to cable television).
163. See Lunney, supra note 12, at 205 (noting upon the granting of certiorari that “[b]y doing
so, the Court has seized an opportunity to bring some rationality to copyright’s line between
public and private performances”); Sam Méndez, Aereo and Cablevision: How Courts are
Struggling to Harmonize the Public Performance Right with Online Retransmission of Broadcast
Television, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 239, 241 (2014) (“The Court’s eventual decision has the
potential to change our conception of what it means to publicly perform. Specifically, the Court
must address what constitutes an online public performance.”).
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computing.164 However, the Court dismissed these concerns and
embraced an interpretation of the Transmit Clause based on Aereo’s
similarity to cable television that leaves cloud developers with great
uncertainty.165 Although the Court attempted to limit its holding so as
to not implicate the remote storage of content by those acting as owners,
it did not provide interpretative guidance for how courts are to
determine when this occurs.166
First, this Part discusses the arguments that each party briefed for the
Court, focusing specifically on each side’s characterization of the
implications for cloud technologies.167 Then, this Part discusses the
majority opinion, emphasizing the Court’s interpretation of the Transmit
Clause and its perceived effect on cloud technology.168 Finally this Part
discusses Justice Scalia’s dissent.169
1. The Parties’ Arguments
The petitioners characterized Aereo as nothing more than a
retransmission business utilizing a complex technological scheme to get

164. See Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 26–29 (discussing why cloud storage
technologies should not be swept up into the Transmit Clause’s definition of public performance);
Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n and Mozilla Corp. as Amici Curiae In
Support of Respondent at 19, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461) [hereinafter Mozilla Brief] (“[The] petitioners propose a standard premised
on aggregating ‘prior’ performances. But that test would threaten cloud computing without
changing how consumers can receive today’s over-the-air broadcasters.” (citation omitted)); Brief
of Amici Curiae The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, The Consumer
Electronics Ass’n, and Engine Advocacy in Support of Respondent at 5, Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) [hereinafter EFF Brief] (“[T]he
predominant interpretative approach suggested by petitioners and their amici—that the Court
should construe exclusive rights to include all financially valuable uses of copyrighted works—
would strip away the commercial freedom . . . [of] many Internet-based services.”); Giblin &
Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 23 (“[T]he broadcasters’ interpretation raises concerns about its
possible effect on other technologies, particularly those providing cloud storage services.”). The
main focus of the concern is that if the Court were to adopt an interpretation that focuses on the
potential audience of the underlying work and not the audience of the particular transmission,
many seemingly private and non-infringing uses may get swept up under the theory of public
performance because of a consumer’s use of the cloud. Professors Giblin and Ginsburg provide
the following example: “Imagine that a user records a broadcast of a particular NFL football
game, and, intending to watch it at a more convenient time, uploads that recording to her private
Dropbox account. When she later streams the recorded broadcast from her Dropbox, is Dropbox
engaging in an infringing public performance?” Id. at 24.
165. See infra Parts III–IV (discussing the Court’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause and
its effect on cloud computing).
166. See infra Part III (discussing the ambiguity and uncertainty the Court’s decision creates).
167. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the arguments of the parties).
168. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the majority opinion).
169. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent).
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around copyright law in order to offer a cheap product.170 The
petitioners particularly took issue with the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the Transmit Clause, instead arguing that Aereo’s
configuration of devices (individual antennas and RS-DVRs) should not
allow it to circumvent a clause that clearly contemplates members of the
public being able to see the transmitted performance in separate places
or at separate times by any means or device.171
In the petitioners’ view, the legal issue that Aereo’s service
provided—third party retransmission of broadcast television signals to
customers without compensating the copyright holder—was exactly the
same one cable television posed in the 1960s and 1970s and which
Congress firmly decided by enacting the Copyright Act that included
the Transmit Clause.172 According to the petitioners, the key distinction
Congress made when it rejected the Supreme Court’s holdings from
Fortnightly and Teleprompter was the difference between private
individuals receiving television programming for free and commercial
entities profiting from carrying those same signals.173 The petitioners
further argued that Congress, while incapable of foreseeing a
technology like Aereo, intended the Transmit Clause to prevent
technological workarounds that avoid liability by purposely including in
the statute that it reached transmissions “by any device or process.”174

170. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 18. This strain of argument has a long history in
copyright law. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931)
(discussing how the Court found that technological innovation did not absolve it of its duty to
protect copyright holders); see also Part I.C (discussing how Congress intended to encapsulate
similar retransmission functions of cable television in to the ambit of the Copyright Act).
171. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 19 (“Congress could not have been clearer that it
does not matter whether members of the public receive these unauthorized retransmissions ‘in the
same place or in separate places,’ or, for that matter, ‘at the same time or at different times.’ And
the precise technical details of how Aereo provides this service—with one big antenna, thousands
of little ones, or in some other manner—likewise are irrelevant. The transmit clause is expressly
indifferent to technical details; it reaches transmission by ‘any device or process,’ whether
‘known’ in 1976 ‘or later developed.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); see supra Part I.C
(discussing the language of the Transmit Clause and its intended purpose to be technologically
neutral).
172. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 26–27; see supra Parts I.B–C (discussing the
Court’s decisions regarding cable television and how Congress reacted against those decisions
when passing the Copyright Act of 1976 to ensure such activities constituted infringement).
173. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 27; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976)
(“[T]he Committee believes that cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and that
copyright royalties should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such programs.” (emphasis
added)).
174. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 30 (“Congress did not want to risk any possibility
that changes in technology would render the transmit clause a nullity.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 64)); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (“Each and every method by which the images
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Advocating a specific view of the legislative intent informing the
Copyright Act, the petitioners argued that the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the Transmit Clause must be incorrect.175 In the
petitioners’ minds, the Second Circuit’s view that the statute’s focus is
on the potential audience of the particular transmission and not the
underlying performance rendered the language of the statute—making a
transmission to the public even if the members of the public are
“capable of receiving the performance . . . at different times”—
superfluous.176 Such a reading would go against longstanding canons
of statutory interpretation.177 Moreover, the petitioners argued that the
Second Circuit fundamentally misread the Transmit Clause, which only
referred to whether the public is “capable of receiving the performance
or display,” not a transmission.178 The petitioners likewise dismissed
the Second Circuit’s transmissions-from-the-same-copy distinction as
having no basis in the text of the Transmit Clause.179 The heart of the
Aereo petitioners’ argument was that the Second Circuit had completely
or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission,’
and if the transmission reaches the public in my form, the case comes within the scope of clauses
(4) or (5) of section 106.”).
175. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 31.
The petitioners argued that
“[n]otwithstanding the obvious reality that Aereo offers exactly the kind of service that Congress
enacted the transmit clause to reach, the Second Circuit concluded that when Aereo
simultaneously retransmits the same broadcast . . . it is engaged in thousands of ‘private’
performances that do not implicate” the public performance right. Id. This view was also
reflected by the United States in its amicus brief, noting “[t]he Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Cablevision, which treated the performance created by the act of transmission as the only relevant
performance for purposes of the infringement analysis, reflected an erroneous interpretation of the
Transmit Clause.” Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 32–33.
176. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 33 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
The United States, as amicus, echoed this argument when it noted that the Second Circuit’s
reasoning “essentially read out” this language from the statute. Id. at 15.
177. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2007) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must
be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute. A statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the
provision is the result of obvious mistake or error. No clause, sentence or word shall be
construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if a construction can be found which will give
force to and preserve all the words of the statute.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
178. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 33 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101); see id. at 10 (discussing how “according to the Second
Circuit, when Congress wrote ‘capable of receiving the performance or display,’ 17 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added), it actually meant ‘capable of receiving the transmission’”).
179. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 36. But see NIMMER, supra note 37, §
8.14[C][3][a] (discussing the meaning of the Transmit Clause and concluding that the “at
different times” language of the Clause could refer to a single copy of a work offered to the
public and which is repeatedly played).
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misread a statute that Congress had intentionally drafted to cover
commercial entities using new technology to avoid liability.180
The petitioners also dismissed Aereo’s arguments that a ruling
adopting petitioners’ interpretation of the Transmit Clause would
imperil the future of new technology platforms, such as cloud
computing.181
In the petitioners’ view, Aereo was easily
distinguishable from cloud computing: Aereo transmitted unauthorized
copyrighted reproductions to the public for free, and cloud computing
simply offers storage and remote access to content users have legally
obtained.182 The petitioners analogized Aereo to a copy shop providing
access to a machine preloaded with protected works.183 In such an
instance the shop owner would still be liable even though the customer
actually made the copy; this is in contrast to the copy shop that allows a
customer to copy a protected work the customer had previously
obtained.184 In fact, the petitioners further argued that Congress had
already passed legislation limiting the liability of cloud-like entities for
storing protected works uploaded by their users with the safe-harbor
provisions incorporated into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) via the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act.185 The petitioners went on to contrast Aereo with services like
180. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 37; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976)
(discussing Congress’ intent to ensure commercial entities, as represented by the cable television
providers, were not avoiding paying the broadcast television providers); supra Part I.B–C
(reviewing how new technologies taking advantage of gaps in existing copyright law have been a
catalyst for copyright reform).
181. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 45–46; see Brief for the United States, supra note
135, at 31–32 (arguing that the Court adopting an interpretation of the Transmit Clause favored
by the petitioners would not likely harm developments in cloud computing).
182. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 46. In the petitioners’ Reply Brief they further
argued: “There is an obvious difference between providing storage for content that the end-user
independently possesses and making the content itself available to anyone who pays a fee,” and
further noted that other entities who engage in the latter activity pay licensing fees or royalties.
Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 144, at 3.
183. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 18.
184. Id.; see Anderson J. Duff, Aereo: Car Dealership or Copy Shop?, WIRED (July 16, 2014,
5:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/aereo-car-dealership-copy-shop/ (discussing the
petitioners’ copy shop analogy). The petitioners go on to argue that “[b]ecause Aereo is offering
not just a piece of equipment, but an integrated service that includes access to copyrighted
content, its efforts to suggest that it is a mere equipment supplier and only its subscribers perform
are doomed.” Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 18.
185. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012).
Passed as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, this Act contains a section entitled
“Limitations on liability relating to material online,” which limits a service provider’s potential
liability if they neither not know nor have constructive knowledge of a user’s infringing activity
engaged, but when the service provider discovers such infringing content, it acts expeditiously in
removing it. Id. For an example of the safe harbor provision in effect, see Ellison v. Robertson,
357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
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iTunes that offer content, as well as storage, because the latter have
previously obtained licenses from the copyright holders that permit
them to offer the content.186 The petitioners concluded that a decision
adopting Aereo’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause would have far
reaching and disruptive implications for copyright law and the Internet,
including whether media-streaming businesses like Netflix or Hulu
would still have to seek licenses at all from rights holders.187
In contrast, Aereo’s argument began by paralleling the Second
Circuit’s: by its own terms, the Copyright Act finds a performance
infringing only if it is to the public, and further states that a transmission
is itself a performance, so therefore Aereo could infringe only if a
particular transmission-performance was cable of being received by the
public.188 Because a particular Aereo transmission was only available
to one subscriber, it therefore could not be to the public.189
Furthermore, Aereo, in agreement with the Second Circuit, argued that
nothing within the Transmit Clause allowed for the aggregation of the
private transmissions to transform them into a public performance.190
Aereo further argued that the petitioners were wrong in asserting that
186. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 22; see Brief for the United States, supra
note 135, at 33–34 (making a similar argument).
187. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 22. This argument ignored the Second
Circuit’s distinctions between multiple transmissions stemming from a single copy and multiple
transitions stemming from multiple copies. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536
F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008); see also supra Part I.D (discussing the Second Circuit’s rationale in
Cablevision).
188. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 22–23 (outlining its interpretation of the
Transmit Clause and the relevant framework for determining liability); see also NIMMER, supra
note 37, § 8-14[B][1] (noting that under the Copyright Act of 1976 “[t]hus, the act of
broadcasting a work is itself a performance of that work”).
189. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 23; see also NIMMER, supra note 37, § 814[C][2] (“If a transmission is only available to one person, then it clearly fails to qualify as
‘public.’”). Aereo illustrates the difference as follows:
A theater company’s performance of “Rent” in a locked and empty theater would not
be a public performance, but, if it were broadcast to the public live, the transmission
would be a public performance. If a transmission encoding the images and sounds
were further transmitted by Defendant A to Defendant B, that would be a private
performance; if Defendant B retransmitted the sounds and images to the public, that
transmission would be a public performance. In each case, the audience capable of
receiving a particular transmission is what determines whether the transmission is a
“public performance.”
Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 23.
190. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 25; see WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d
676, 688 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (rejecting the argument that the Transmit
Clause allows for the aggregation of separate transmissions); see also supra Part II.B (discussing
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Aereo and noting how the appellate court rejected focusing on the
availability of the underlying work to the public for a focus on the availability of the particular
transmission to the public).
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Aereo’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause read out of the statute the
at “different times” language.191 As its basis for this, Aereo cited to the
legislative history that provided an example of a transmission capable
of reaching the public at different times as media stored on an
information system that is then performed repeatedly, at separate times,
at the initiation of individual members of the public.192 However,
because Aereo’s system did not store content that any member of the
public could request (each copy was unique to a subscriber), Aereo
argued that it was not reading the “different times” language out of the
statute.193 This analysis of the statutory text tracked the Second
Circuit’s distinction between single and multiple copy transmissions: a
single copy of a work stored on an information system and held out to
the public is a transmission capable of being received by the public at
different times; whereas multiple unique copies of the same work
available to only one individual, are not.194
Moreover, Aereo argued that, even assuming the Transmit Clause is
directed at the underlying performance (and not that of the particular
transmission-performance), the petitioners’ argument still fails because
the relevant underlying performance was each unique recording, not the
original, freely available broadcast.195 According to Aereo, the manner
191. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 25.
192. Id. at 26; see H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 29 (1967) (“[A] performance made available by
transmission to the public at large is ‘public’ even though . . . the transmission is capable of
reaching different recipients at different times, as in the case of sounds or images stored in an
information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual
members of the public.”). This same quotation was instrumental for the Second Circuit’s
Cablevision decision as well. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 135
(2008) (using the same quotation in the analysis of the case). Professor Nimmer, in his treatise on
copyright likewise provided a similar example of this, supra note 109.
193. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 26. In order to make this argument Aereo
adopted the master or “single copy” distinction that the Second Circuit utilized in Cablevision.
See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2008) (concluding there was
a fundamental difference between multiple transmission stemming from a single copy and those
stemming from separate copies).
194. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137 (arguing that if a particular transmission is not
available to the public, no public performance occurs); Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at
27. For the Second Circuit’s discussion of this in Cablevision, see supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
195. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 27. Aereo construes its position thusly: “[a]
broadcaster could perform a movie by showing its images and sounds to the audience by means
of a transmission; an individual could record the movie and play it the next day, thereby
separately performing the work.” Id. at 28. This is the distinction between a retransmission and
the theory of “multiple performances.” See NIMMER, supra note 37, § 8-18[A] (commenting on
the doctrine of multiple performances: “The phenomenon is seen most clearly in the case of
phonorecords. One performance occurs at the time the rendition is recorded. This instance may
or may not be a public performance, but it is nevertheless surely a performance. It is clear, under
the Act, that, if and when the phonorecord thus created is “played,” an additional performance of
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in which its service functioned—a subscriber initiated a command
allowing her DVR to make a user-specific copy and that copy was then
transmitted to her—coupled with the user’s ability to pause and rewind,
created a separate performance than that which the broadcaster
transmitted to the public.196 Aero argued that the import of this is that it
is not offering “retransmissions,” and therefore does not implicate
section 111 of the Copyright Act, which established the compulsory
license for cable television’s retransmission of broadcast television.197
Aereo also argued that, because its subscribers were the ones who
“performed” the underlying work, Aereo could not be found to have
directly infringed copyright holders’ public performance right.198
Comparing itself to the technologies from the Court’s precedent in Sony
(VTRs) and Grokster (peer-to-peer file sharing software),199 Aereo
argued that it only provided equipment that allowed its users to engage
in infringing activity; so, at most, if at all, it could be found liable for
contributory infringement.200 Relying on lower-court decisions that
the same rendition occurs, which will constitute an infringement if it is unauthorized and is
public.” (footnote omitted)).
196. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 29. Aereo analogizes the distinction as follows:
[T]he difference between the user’s playback and the broadcaster’s performance may
not be apparent when the user simply plays her recording without interruption . . . .
The difference becomes obvious, however, the moment the user hits “pause” (or
“rewind”): the user controls the images and sounds she receives – it is her act of
showing that she views through a transmission from Aereo’s equipment to her device.
Id. at 29–30; see Brief of Cablevision Syst. Corp. as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners, at
22–24, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461)
(arguing that the relevant performance is a separate performance created by the act of
transmission and not the underlying broadcast performance).
197. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 34 (“The distinction between retransmission of
a broadcaster’s performance and transmission of a performance from an individual copy of the
broadcast is strongly reinforced by § 111, which draws that very distinction.”); see 17 U.S.C. §
111 (2012) (laying out the compulsory license).
198. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 40. As discussed above, this debate over which
participant “performs” has been of increasing importance, and subject of litigation. See supra
note 115 and accompanying text (quoting Professor Goldstein in his discussion of the diminishing
returns copyright holders receive for pursuing direct infringers in the context of the Internet).
199. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–921 (2005)
(discussing whether the distributor of a file sharing software was liable under a theory of
contributory infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984) (discussing whether the manufacturer of a VTR was liable for the infringing acts of its
customers). At issue in both the Sony and Grokster litigations were the contentions, ultimately
adopted by the Court in both instances, that what those two companies were engaged in could not
be said to be direct infringement at all, but, if anything, only contributory infringement. See
supra Part I.E (discussing these two cases).
200. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 41. Again, the Court in the Sony litigation
adopted similar arguments with respect to VTRs. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (discussing whether
Sony, and equipment provider whose only contact with the direct infringer was the point of sale,
could be liable under a theory of contributory liability).
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refused to find direct liability in the absence of volitional conduct,
Aereo argued that it could not be held directly liable for its service’s
automated response to a subscriber’s command.201 Moreover, Aereo
argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor
provisions evince Congress’s intent to limit liability in the absence of
volitional conduct.202 Given the amount of subscriber control, the
passivity and automation of Aereo’s service, Aereo concluded it did not
fall within the contemplated framework of direct liability.203
Aereo’s final argument was that a ruling against it would have
devastating consequences for cloud computing technologies.204 If the
petitioners’ view of the Transmit Clause (that the relevant framework is
the potential audience of the underlying protected work and not that of
the subscriber specific copy-transmission) were to be adopted, Aereo
argued that (for example) Google would become liable for an infringing
public performance when two users of Google Drive individually play
the same song from two distinct copies that are stored on Google’s
servers.205 Furthermore, Aereo argued that the petitioners’ attempt to
distinguish Aereo from cloud technologies—because, in the latter, the
users had previously obtained licensed copies—failed, as it actually has
no basis in the statute.206 Moreover, such an interpretation would still
201. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 42–43. For a discussion regarding the volitional
act test, see supra Part I.E; see also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The person who actually presses the button to make the recording[] supplies
the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or . . . owns the
machine.”).
202. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 43. For the text of safe harbor provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which limit liability for Internet service providers when their
users engage in infringing activity, see text accompanying supra note 185.
203. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 43; Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19,
at 6 (arguing that the activity that Aereo engages in lacks the necessary element of volition for
direct infringement).
204. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 48–49. Many shared this concern. See, e.g.,
supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (noting the shared concern of many that the Court’s
decision in Aereo could alter cloud computing’s legality).
205. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 49. Google describes Google Drive as follows:
“With Google Drive, you can store your files in the cloud, share them with your team members or
external partners and access the files from any device.” Google Apps for Work, Easy and Secure
File Sharing, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/a/signup/?hl=en&source=gafb-drive-canvasen-drivesignup&enterprise_product=DRIVE&ga_region=noram&ga_country=us&ga_lang=en#0
(last visited Apr. 26, 2015). Therefore, Aereo argued, two users may store or record the same
content independently on Google Drive, and when they stream that content back to themselves,
they will be engaging in the same “infringing” activity as Aereo would be if the petitioners’ view
were adopted. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 49.
206. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 50–51. This is an analogous argument to the
one made by the Second Circuit in its Cablevision decision, in which the court found it did not
matter whether the cable companies had obtained licenses in the first instance because this did not
affect whether its subsequent actions were infringing. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712
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leave cloud-service providers open to liability if their users uploaded
unlawful copies, which a provider could not determine without costly
monitoring systems to ensure each uploaded copy was noninfringing.207
In Aereo’s estimation, this would destroy the cloud industry.208
2. The Majority Opinion: Aereo’s Fatal Similarity to Cable
The limited question before the Supreme Court was whether Aereo
directly infringed the public performance rights held by the television
producers when protected works were transmitted to subscribers over
Aereo’s system.209 Because protected works were not transmitted until
a subscriber initiated the transmission and each subscriber had a
subscriber-specific copy, the interpretive challenge for the Court was
whether Aereo “performed”—as defined by the Copyright Act—and if
so, whether it did so publicly.210 The Court responded to both of these
issues in the affirmative and adopted the interpretation of the Transmit
Clause put forth by the petitioners.211 First, the Court used Aereo’s
similarity to cable television providers to find that Congress intended
for the Copyright Act to cover Aereo’s activities.212 Second, the Court

F.3d 676, 694 (2nd Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (concluding that the license for the
initial retransmission did not affect whether subsequent (unauthorized) transmissions were
infringing). Aereo also made an argument that is beyond the scope of this Note regarding the
“fair use” doctrine. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 20. In brief, however, under the
doctrine of fair use a consumer can make a non-infringing personal copy of lawfully obtained
content. Thus, because Aereo’s subscribers were in effect making personal copies of freely
available broadcasts for legitimate time-shifting purposes under a theory of fair use, then its
subscribers were likewise transmitting non-infringing copies to themselves. Id.
207. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 51; see infra Part IV.B (discussing how the
Court’s decision will affect cloud computing in greater detail).
208. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 51 (“No industry could operate under such an
obligation.”).
209. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014); Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 137, at i (describing the limited question on appeal).
210. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504. These questions have repeatedly been presented to the Court
as new technologies have pushed the definitional boundaries of existing law. See Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§101–810 (2012)), as recognized in Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct.
2498 (2014) (discussing whether CATV retransmissions resulted in an infringing public
performance under the 1909 Act); Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 195 (1931)
(discussing whether radio transmission implicated the 1909 Act); supra Part I.A–B (discussing
how the Court has responded to these two technological developments); see also Cartoon
Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing whether RSDVRs implicate the Transmit Clause of the 1976 Act).
211. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511; see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 33 (setting forth
their interpretation of the Transmit Clause).
212. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506. But see WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676, 690 (2d
Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (in which the Second Circuit, citing to the same House
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determined that Aereo performs “publicly” by interpreting the Transmit
Clause along the lines advocated by the petitioners.213 Third, the Court
dismissed, in general terms, the concerns its ruling would have on cloud
computing and other technologies.214
The Court began its decision by reviewing the Fortnightly and
Teleprompter cases and determined that one of the primary purposes of
the Copyright Act was to overturn these rulings.215 The Court used an
oft-cited House Report to show that the Copyright Act dismissed the
Court’s previous distinction between broadcaster and viewer.216
Moreover, the Aereo Court noted that the Copyright Act also introduced
the Transmit Clause, which made it a “public performance” to transmit
a performance to the public.217 Finally, the Copyright Act introduced
the compulsory license that forced cable companies to pay fees for the
retransmission of broadcast television.218
The Court in Aereo
determined that all of these changes clearly show Congress’s intent to
make cable television subject to liability under copyright law.219
Turning to Aereo, the Court found that its “activities are substantially
similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act
to reach.”220 Just like those systems, Aereo provided a service that
allowed paying subscribers to watch broadcast television (nearly) live
via its equipment.221 The Court, however, did recognize that Aereo’s
system remained inactive until a subscriber input a command initiating
an automatic response on the part Aereo’s system, whereas cable

Report the Court referred to, perceived a different legislative intent). For the Second Circuit’s
discussion that Congress’s primary intent was to only capture public performances while still
leaving room for private, non-infringing performances, see supra note 160 and accompanying
text.
213. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507–10; see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 19 (setting
forth its argument that Aereo performs publically); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the petitioner’s
arguments).
214. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510–11; see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 45–46
(discussing the petitioners’ argument for why a ruling favoring them would not harm cloud
computing); see also supra Part III.C.1 (discussing Aereo and others’ contention that the Court’s
ruling could irreparably harm cloud computing).
215. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505.
216. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 87 (1976) (noting that the Copyright Act “completely
overturned” Aiken, Fortnightly, and Teleprompter).
217. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (setting forth the Transmit Clause).
218. 17 U.S.C. § 111.
219. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506; see supra Part I.C (reviewing Congress’s intent to overturn the
Court’s Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions by passing the Copyright Act).
220. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506.
221. Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976) (discussing Congress’s concern of allowing
commercial entities to get away with not compensating broadcast television providers for the
retransmission of their protected works).
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television transmitted constantly, without user initiation.222
It was this distinction that Aero claimed meant that the subscriber,
not Aereo, did the performing.223 However, the Court found no
significance in this distinction in light of the high degree of similarity
between Aereo and the cable television services Congress intended to
bring under the Act.224 Noting that the CATV subscriber could also
select what program to view, the Court found the user experience was
practically the same, despite how Aereo functioned behind the
scenes.225 The Court noted that in other situations, the user’s
participation in operating a provider’s equipment could influence the
determination of who performs, but not here, in light of Aereo’s
substantial likeness to cable television.226 The Court, however, offered
no guidance on how or when to make this determination.
Having concluded that Aereo “perform[ed]” under the Act, the Court
then addressed whether Aereo performed “publicly.”227 The Court
assumed arguendo that Aereo transmitted a new performance (the
performance created by the transmission) and was not retransmitting the
prior performance of the broadcasters.228 However, by proceeding
under this theory the Court undermined its earlier conclusions that
222. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507; see Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 40 (“This Court
should affirm for the additional reason that Aereo’s users, not Aereo, play and transmit the
recordings of broadcast content and therefore ‘perform’ within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.”); see supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Aereo’s argument that it did not perform at all given that
its system remained inert until a subscriber initiated some action).
223. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 29 (arguing that the subscriber is the relevant
performer, not Aereo); see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (discussing Aereo’s argument that its users
“perform” and it does not).
224. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507. The Court made the comparison that just like Aereo, cable
television “signals, in a sense, lurked behind the screen, ready to emerge when the subscriber
turned the knob.” Id.
225. Id. The Court characterized selecting a program on Aereo’s website as “today’s ‘turn of
the knob,’” allowing the user access to whichever program she wished, just as turning the knob
on the television set did the same for the cable viewer, and any other difference “means nothing”
to the subscriber, or the broadcaster. Id. But see Matthew Schruers, Symposium: Aereo
Copyright Decision Creates Uncertainty for the Cloud, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:55
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-copyright-decision-creates-uncertain
ty-for-the-cloud/ (noting that this approach “is crafted against the backdrop of a Copyright Act
that very deliberately treats substantially similar services quite differently. Even as yesterday’s
decision was being handed down, the House Judiciary Committee was hearing how the Copyright
Act treats very similar services in radically different ways (often for reasons having more to do
with political economy than information policy). For example, terrestrial radio pays no
performance fees for sound recordings; satellite radio must pay, however, based on one standard;
Internet radio pays even more, based on an entirely different standard. Yet all of them ‘look like’
radio.”).
226. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
227. Id. at 2507–08.
228. Id. at 2508.
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Aereo’s similarity to cable television meant it fell within the Act given
Congress’s intent to ensure liability for cable television providers’
retransmissions of broadcast television programs.229
Nonetheless, the Court found the fact that each particular
performance-transmissions was available to only one subscriber did not
mean that Aereo was not transmitting a performance “to the public,” as
defined under the Copyright Act.230 Again, the Court refused to give
any weight to the functional or technological architecture of Aereo’s
system, concluding “the behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers
television programming to its viewers’ screens” did not modify the
viewing experience of the subscriber, nor Aereo’s fundamental profitmaking purpose.231 Of particular concern to the Court was if modern
cable television providers could get around Congress’s intent merely by
substituting Aereo’s technological configuration for their old antenna
and coaxial cable set up; a result Congress would not have intended.232
Turning to the text of the Transmit Clause, the Court found that it
contemplates that “to transmit a performance” may be done by multiple
transmissions because it is possible to “‘transmit’ or ‘communicate’
something through a set of actions.”233 Siding with the petitioners, the
Court concluded that the Copyright Act must be interpreted this way
because it explicitly includes transmissions available to the public “at
different times,” which would be impossible if the language was limited
229. See Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 26 (arguing that there are salient
differences between cable television and Aereo); EFF Brief, supra note 164, at 17 (“Unlike a
cable or satellite system, [Aereo’s] video signal is never shared among subscribers anywhere
between its capture from the public airwaves and its viewing.”); infra Part II.C.3 (discussing
Justice Scalia’s dissent and his concern that the Court ignored fundamental differences between
how these technologies function).
230. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. The United States in its amicus brief likewise argued this
position. Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 13–14.
231. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. This concern clearly echoed the perceived intent of Congress
to prevent the cable television commercial enterprises from avoiding paying broadcast television
providers as well. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
commercial and private actors). However, the Court did not explain how this potential outcome
would mean cable television systems could avoid the compulsory license, which they would still
be subject to under the Act. See 17 U.S.C § 111 (2012) (requiring cable television’s secondary
retransmission of primary broadcast transmission to be part of the compulsory license).
232. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
233. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). The Court provided the following example of what it
means by a “set of actions”:
Thus one can transmit a message to one’s friends, irrespective of whether one sends
separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single e-mail to all at once. So can an
elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to her constituents, regardless
of whether she communicates that idea, slogan, or speech during individual phone calls
to each constituent or in a public square.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
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to a single act of communication.234 Therefore, Court adopted the
petitioners’ interpretation of the Transmit Clause by finding that when
an entity transmits the same underlying work to multiple people, it is
transmitting a performance to the public, notwithstanding that this is
accomplished by a number of discrete transmissions and copies.235
Moreover, the Court concluded that Aereo was transmitting to the
“public” because it was not argued, nor evident from the record, that
Aereo’s subscribers were receiving transmissions “in their capacities as
owners or possessors of the underlying works.”236 The Court indicated
that whether or not a performance is “to the public” could be influenced
by viewer’s relationship to an underlying work.237
Finally the Court addressed Aereo’s and many amici’s concern that
this interpretation of the Transmit Clause will have on cloud
computing.238 The Court, noting that it was not Congress’ intent to
stifle technological innovation by inserting the Transmit Clause, did not
believe that its ruling would have such a negative impact.239 Oddly
enough, the Court’s first justification for this belief was that its decision
is limited to Aereo and did not decide whether other entities with
similar frameworks likewise “perform”—as if lingering questions over
legality should resolve the concerns over cloud technology.240

234. Id.
235. Id. (“So whether Aereo transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same
work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same sounds. Therefore, when Aereo
streams the same television program to multiple subscribers, it ‘transmit[s] . . . a performance’ to
all of them.”). For the petitioners’ articulation of their conception of the Transmit Clause, see
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 31 (arguing that the relevant performance at issue is
whether the underlying performance is viewable by the public).
236. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
237. Id. at 2510 (“[A]n entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities as
owners or possessors does not perform to ‘the public,’ whereas an entity like Aereo that transmits
to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the works does so
perform.”); see Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 31 (arguing that what makes Aereo
liable is that it provides subscribers with access to content “in the first instance” when there is no
prior existing relationship between the content and the subscriber).
238. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
239. Id. This is an apparent nod to the Copyright Clause’s other provision, that of securing
these protections for authors and inventors with the end goal of promoting science and the public
interest. See supra Part I.A (discussing the foundational principles of United States copyright
law).
240. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. But cf. Jeff Pulver, Freedom to Innovate Key to Internet
Future, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/201
4/09/16/jeff-pulver-net-neutrality-open-internet-column/15663385/ (discussion by founder of
Vonage of how “legal uncertainty was the single greatest impediment to innovation” in regards to
whether Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 would apply to VoIP (internet telephony));
infra Part IV.B (discussing in greater detail the relation between legal certainty and increased
investment in cloud computing).
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Additionally, the Court specifically stated that its definition of “to the
public” did not extend to those acting as owners or possessors of the
relevant product.241 The Court also stated that its opinion did not
consider whether the public performance right is implicated if a service
primarily exists for the remote storage of lawfully obtained conduct.242
Ultimately though, the Court concluded it could not provide a clearer
answer for how the Transmit Clause would apply to cloud technologies
without a more applicable case before it and suggested that Congress
could address the issue.243 However, because the Court found that
Aereo “performed,” and did so “publicly,” when it transmitted the same
underlying performance to the public, regardless of the number of
discrete transmissions, the Court held that Aereo had directly violated
the petitioners’ public performance rights under the Copyright Act.244
3. Justice Scalia’s Dissent: Unnecessary Uncertainty
Justice Scalia’s dissent began by arguing that the volitional act test
should govern in cases involving claims of direct infringement.245 He
argued this was the correct interpretation of the Copyright Act, which
utilized active, affirmative verbs when defining what it means to
perform.246 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted every appellate court that
had considered direct liability for automated-service providers had
embraced the volitional act test.247 Finally, he argued that, though not

241. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
242. Id. at 2511. However, whether this is a fair distinction is unclear; it would seem to only
insulate a cloud provider whose users refrained from streaming the content they stored. For
certain types of content stored in the cloud this is unlikely. See infra note 349 and accompanying
text (noting how most audiovisual works stored in the cloud are streamed).
243. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“[T]o the extent commercial actors or other interested entities
may be concerned with the relationship between the development and use of such technologies
and the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action from Congress.”). Similar concerns
were likewise present in the Sony litigation, but from the perspective that the Court should be
circumspect in interpreting the law when Congress’ intent is unclear. Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (“In a case like this, in which Congress has not
plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a
legislative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”).
244. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
245. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see 2 PATRY, supra note 21, § 9:5.50 (discussing how courts have required an
element of volitional conduct before attaching liability to an alleged direct infringer); see also
supra Part I.E (discussing the use of the volitional act requirement).
246. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing the following examples
“[o]ne ‘perform[s]’ a copyrighted ‘audiovisual work,’ such as a movie or news broadcast, by
‘show[ing] its images in any sequence’ or ‘mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audible.’”
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012))).
247. Id. at 2512 (citing cases from the Ninth Circuit (Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC,
747 F.3d 1060, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2014)), the Second Circuit (Cartoon Network LP v. CSC.
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explicitly embracing the volitional act analysis, prior Court precedent
was consistent with it.248 Likening Aereo to a “copy shop that provides
its patrons with a library card,” Justice Scalia found Aereo did not
perform; instead, Aereo, like the copy shop, only provided the
opportunity for the volitional (infringing) acts of its subscribers.249
However, he did not assert that Aereo should not be held liable at all;
the original complaint contained alternative theories of liability, and so
affirming the Second Circuit’s decision would remand the case for
determination on those issues.250
Next, Justice Scalia took issue with the Court’s “guilt by
resemblance” reasoning.251 While he began by noting the ambiguities
inherent in legislative history,252 he quickly turned to how the Court
ignored important functional differences between Aereo and the cable
television providers of Fortnightly and Teleprompter.253
Most
significant for Justice Scalia was that the Court’s decision, in effect,
abandoned the volitional act test and created a “this looks like cable
TV” standard.254 Justice Scalia concluded that the Court’s decision
would create uncertainty because if the volitional conduct requirement
was not outcome determinative in Aereo, than it probably was not (and

Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008)), and the Fourth Circuit (CoStar Grp. Inc. v.
LoopNet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549–50 (4th Cir. 2004))).
248. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 2514. This is an apparent contrast to the petitioners’ analogy of Aereo as a copy
machine preloaded with protected works. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 18
(“Aereo is more like a copy shop that provides access to a copy machine fully pre-loaded with
copyrighted works ready to copy at the push of a button.”).
250. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,
874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (2012) (describing how the complaint alleged direct and contributory
liability for both the public performance and reproduction protections); see also supra Part II.B
(discussing the procedural history of the Aereo litigation).
251. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (noting of the Court’s use of legislative history to determine Congressional intent:
“First, it is built on the shakiest of foundations. Perceiving the text to be ambiguous . . . the Court
reaches out to decide the case based on a few isolated snippets of legislative history . . . . The
Court treats those snippets as authoritative evidence of congressional intent even though they
come from a single report issued by a committee whose members make up a small fraction of one
of the two Houses of Congress. Little else need be said here about the severe shortcomings of
that interpretative methodology.”). But see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (majority opinion) (wherein
the majority also pointed to the creation of the compulsory license as evidence that Congress
intended to overturn the CATV rulings).
253. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Brief for Respondent, supra note
134, at 46–47 (arguing that Aereo’s subscribers initiate the potentially infringing transmissions
whereas cable television systems broadcast to consumers without the consumer initiating); see
also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Aereo’s arguments for how its technology is distinguishable
from cable television).
254. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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will not be) elsewhere.255 Secondly, by finding Aereo liable because it
“looks like cable TV,” the Court created a new standard of copyright
liability, but left the lower courts no criteria for how, and to whom, it
applies.256 The end result will be years of expensive litigation to sort
out how this new standard should be applied and to which type of online
(cloud) services.257 Instead, Scalia thought the case should be decided
on the other forms of copyright infringement initially pleaded, and, if
those options were insufficient, to leave it for Congress to fix the
loophole in copyright law—as the Court has permitted previously.258
III. ANALYSIS
This Part examines the interpretive difficulties resulting from the
Court’s decision. First, this Part reviews the strengths and weaknesses
Second, this Part describes the
of the Court’s reasoning.259
interpretative challenges created by the Court’s interpretation of the
Transmit Clause.260 Finally, this Part discusses viable alternatives the
Court could have adopted to avoid the uncertainty its decision created
while still protecting copyright holders’ interests.261
A. No Guidance for Future Technologies
The Court’s decision in Aereo attempted to prevent different
255. Id.; see infra Part IV.A–B (discussing in greater detail the potential effect of the
majority’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause).
256. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia casts the problem in
these terms: “[m]aking matters worse, the Court provides no criteria for determining when its
cable-TV-lookalike rule applies. Must a defendant offer access to live television to qualify?” Id.;
see Stoltz, supra note 23 (arguing that the decision “injects” uncertainty into copyright law).
257. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It will take years, perhaps decades, to
determine which automated systems now in existence are governed by the traditional volitionalconduct test and which get the Aereo treatment. (And automated systems now in contemplation
will have to take their chances.)”); see Schruers, supra note 225 (noting the “uncertainty” with
which the decision leaves lawyers of cloud computing companies).
258. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the Court
“need not distort” copyright law to stop Aereo because of the existence of the alternative theories
of liability, and that, even if those theories were insufficient to protect copyright holders,
Congress, and not the Court, is “better informed” to fashion a solution to plug the “loophole.”
Id.; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 500 (1984) (“Like so
many other problems created by the interaction of copyright law with a new technology, ‘[t]here
can be no really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here, until Congress acts.’”
(citation omitted)); see also supra Part I.B–C (noting that the CATV cases are another example of
when the Court left it to Congress amend the law to better protect copyright holders).
259. See infra Part III.A (examining the merits and difficulties of the Court’s opinion).
260. See infra Part III.B (reviewing the interpretive uncertainties that the Court’s
interpretation of the Transmit Clause creates).
261. See infra Part III.C (proposing alternatives to the Court’s decision that protect copyright
holders while limiting the negative effect to new innovative Internet technologies).
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configurations of technology offering similar features from varying the
level of protection rights holders are afforded under copyright law.262
While the Court’s decision prevents Aereo and others from crafting
multiple-copy, multiple-transmission designs to avoid making public
performances—as the Second Circuit’s interpretation allowed—it
arguably will still result in different technologies being treated
differently, even though they provide similar functions.263 Moreover,
the Court based its decision on the substantial similarity between Aereo
and cable television, yet it ignored significant differences in function
between these two technologies.264 Finally, in its quest to ensure
Aereo’s liability, the Court favored existing technology over new
innovations, at the expense of the Constitution’s other goal of
promoting innovation and the public interest.265
The Court had legitimate concerns for rejecting Aereo’s particular
transmission interpretation of the Transmit Clause.266 The digital
environment makes it virtually cost-free to create unique copies and
provide multiple transmissions,267 thus providing Aereo, or presumably

262. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508 (“In terms of the Act’s purposes, these [technological]
differences do not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems. . . . Viewed in terms of
Congress’ regulatory objectives, why should any of these technological differences matter?”); see
also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Court’s opinion).
263. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09 (discussing how Aereo’s use of personal copies still
results in a public performance); Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 12–13 (discussing how
technology similar to Aereo’s could be treated differently if the Court were to adopt Petitioners’
interpretation of the Transmit Clause).
264. Compare supra Part II.C.1 (the majority dismissing these differences), with supra Part
II.C.2 (Justice Scalia’s accounting of how Aereo and cable television differ).
265. Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 21 (arguing that the position that Court would go on to
adopt, “[i]n real-world terms . . . is far from a ‘technology neutral’ copyright principle, favoring
as it does in-home devices over cloud-based equivalents based on where a hard drive or antenna
happens to be located”). For a discussion of United States copyright law’s other aim: promoting
science and the useful arts, see generally DAVIES, supra note 2 (discussing the public interest
elements and themes of United States’ copyright right regime).
266. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Court’s concerns of allowing Congress’ intent to be
sidestepped); see also McBride, supra note 12, at 22 (“[O]ver 50 million Americans still rely on
the free, over-the-air broadcast as their only source of television. Considering the widespread
availability of cable and satellite service providers, it can be reasonably assumed that a large
portion . . . who use over-the-air broadcasts do so out of financial necessity.”).
267. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2004) (discussing, in the context
of peer-to-peer file sharing over the Internet, that “[t]here is of course a good reason copyright
owners are suing facilitators. They see themselves as under threat from a flood of cheap, easy
copies and a dramatic increase in the number of people who can make those copies.”); Don E.
Tomlinson, Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The Piracy/Counterfeiting Problem and
Antipiracy and Anticounterfeiting Measures, 8 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 3 (1999) (noting
that the technological innovations of the Internet “have made the life of the intellectual-property
pirate much better” because of their increased ability to copy and store pirated works).
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anyone else, an easy means to circumvent the law.268 However, the
Court’s refusal to look behind the scenes at how technology functions
may yet still lead to differing results based on technological design.
Take for example, Simple.tv. Like Aereo, Simple.tv provides its
users with an antenna and a DVR, offering them the ability to stream
live or recorded television programs to their Internet-connected
devices.269 The main difference between Aereo and Simple.tv is that
Simple.tv’s equipment is stored in the user’s home.270 Even after the
Aereo decision it is unlikely that Simple.tv is liable for violating
copyright law; personal DVRs and VTRs have been found not to
infringe, and Simple.tv’s added feature of allowing a user to transmit his
or her personal copies, stored on hard drives in their home, to their own
Internet-connected devices elsewhere, can hardly be said to transform it
to be “to the public.”271 Thus, given the technological and functional
difference between Aereo and Simple.tv, and despite offering an

268. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014)
(presenting the question, if the Court were to adopt Aereo’s view, “why, if Aereo is right, could
not modern CATV systems simply continue the same commercial and consumer-oriented
activities, free of copyright restrictions, provided they substituted such new technologies for
old?”); Méndez, supra note 163, at 266 (arguing that if Aereo were to win “[o]ther companies in
other industries may well follow this reasoning and further circumvent broadcasters’ profit
avenues. As the law stands [under the Second Circuit’s interpretation], there is little stopping
cable and satellite companies from setting up ‘purely private transmissions’ of their own and
circumventing any compensation to the broadcast industry.”). Again, see text accompanying
supra note 231, this argument ignores that cable television providers are legally required to
participate in the compulsory license for what they do, not how they do it. See 17 U.S.C. § 111
(2012) (requiring cable television services to pay broadcast television providers).
269. The Whole Planet DVR, SIMPLE.TV, https://us.simple.tv/#overview (last visited Apr. 26,
2015); see Questions & Answers, SIMPLE.TV, https://us.simple.tv/faq#q1 (last visited Apr. 26,
2015) (“Simple.TV is a personal DVR that streams live and recorded TV programs to webconnected devices like the iPad, Roku media streamer, and PCs and Macs. Depending on the
model, it includes either one or two HDTV tuners that record TV to a [sic] external storage that
you provide. In a nutshell, you get free HDTV on your computer, tablet or connected TV without
a cable subscription.”).
270. The Whole Planet DVR, supra note 269 (describing Simple.tv as “a lovely little box that
sits on your home network, connects to an aerial antenna (or ClearQAM cable), and streams TV
to your devices, plus records to storage that you attach”); see Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 13
(discussing the difference between Aereo and Simple.tv).
271. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984)
(discussing the litigation over VTR technology and whether consumer’s reproduction of
copyrighted works were infringing, the Court found that “[w]hen these factors are all weighed in
the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports the
District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use”); see supra Part I.E (discussing the
Court’s prior decision in Sony as well as the Second Circuit’s Cablevision decision). As of this
writing, it does not appear that suit has been brought against Simple.tv. In fact as one amicus
stated during the Aereo litigation, “[n]either petitioners nor the United States offer an explanation
as to why Aereo is liable when it stores the antenna and hard drive off-site, but the Simple.tv user
is not liable . . . . “). Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 17.
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identical user experience, the former is liable and the latter is likely not.
Likewise, the Court’s decision was based on Aereo’s similarity to
cable television providers,272 but this conclusion dismissed salient
differences between these two technologies: Aereo’s inactivity until a
subscriber initiated a transmission, and the possibility of Aereo’s system
resulting in two distinct transmissions, whereas cable television was
merely retransmitting a prior performance.273 Most importantly,
Aereo’s system remained entirely inactive until the subscriber directed a
copy to be made or a transmission to begin.274 Furthermore, it is the
cable provider that chose what programs to capture, and then retransmit
to a user, whereas Aereo did not make take such actions because it
merely provided access to programs broadcasted by others.275 Even
more inexplicable was that the first half of the Court’s discussion
followed the logic that if Congress intended to bring cable providers
retransmission of protected works into the realm of liability, then
Aereo’s retransmission of those same works must also fall within the
Copyright Act, but the second half of the opinion assumed that Aereo
was not retransmitting, but in fact was transmitting a new
performance.276 Thus, even within the Court’s opinion it implicitly
recognized that Aereo and cable television could be engaged in different
activities, but the Court did not apply this difference when arguing

272. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“Aereo’s
activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the
Act to reach . . . .”). For further discussion, see supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Court’s
decision).
273. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s reasoning fails on its
own terms because there are material differences between . . . cable systems . . . on the one hand
and Aereo on the other.”).
274. See id. (discussing the differences between Aereo and cable television); Brief for
Respondent, supra note 134, at 18 (recounting Aereo’s functionality); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra
note 17, at 4 (describing the same). For a more detailed discussion of these differences, see supra
Part II.C.1 (discussing Aereo’s arguments distinguishing it from cable television).
275. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This analysis is actually quite similar to
how the Court in Fortnightly distinguished CATV from broadcasters—”Broadcasters perform,
viewers do not.” Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 397 (1968).
However as discussed above, supra Part I.C, Congress eliminated this distinction with the
Copyright Act. Presumably Justice Scalia is alluding to Aereo’s argument that the subscriber
performs, Aereo does not. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 27 (arguing that Aereo’s
users perform); Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 6 (discussing how this “should have
been a case about infringement by consumers”).
276. Compare Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506–08 (describing Aereo’s likeness to the CATV
retransmission systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter), with id. at 2508–11 (assuming that the
performance Aereo transmits “comes into existence when Aereo streams” it to a subscriber).
Admittedly the Court does this arguendo, but the fact that the Court chose to proceed under this
assumption, instead of rejecting it and finding, as Petitioners urged, that Aereo was in fact
retransmitting, hints that a real difference exists.
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Aereo’s substantial similarity to the technologies of Fortnightly and
Teleprompter.277
Finally, much of the Court’s opinion was informed by a concern that
technological innovations could circumvent and erode the protections
afforded copyright holders by the Act if the Second Circuit’s
interpretation prevailed.278 However, very little of the opinion
expressed concerned about the effect of its ruling on promoting “the
progress of science and useful arts.”279 As other Supreme Court
copyright cases have noted “[i]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit
of the [rights holder’s] labor may be used by others without
compensation . . . . [but] this is not ‘some unforeseen byproduct of a
statutory scheme’ . . . [i]t is, rather, ‘the essence of copyright,’ and a
constitutional requirement.”280 As discussed below, the Court’s lack of
attention to this latter constitutional requirement has the serious
potential to impede the development of cloud technologies.281
B. Settling One Interpretive Challenge While
Creating Many More
The Court’s opinion concluded that, under the Transmit Clause, a
transmission-performance is “to the public,” if the underlying work is
capable of being received by members of the public and not,
alternatively, the potential audience of particular transmissions,
regardless of the number of copies supplying those transmissions.282
First, the Court’s ruling calls into question the need for a volitional
conduct analysis and therefore potentially upsets numerous cases
decided on those grounds.283 Second, the Court muddied the water of
277. Id. at 2507; see Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 27 (arguing that Aereo’s users
transmit a separate performance than the one initially broadcast).
278. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507–09 (discussing how, “in light of Congress’ basic purposes” in
passing the Copyright Act, Aereo’s technological configuration and commercial intent should not
allow it to avoid the protections for copyright holders Congress put in the act).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl 8. Even when the Court addressed the potential effect its
decision might have on the development of new technologies, see supra Part II.C.2, it only
offered up some limiting language that has been viewed as ineffective. See, e.g., Lackman, supra
note 22 (“The Court took efforts to limit its holding to just the technology at bar, but the question
remains as to whether the opinion is as narrow as the Court hoped. Notably, the court in the
decision that inspired Aereo’s architecture (known as the Cablevision decision) also said that the
holding was limited to its facts. It may be the end of Aereo, but if history repeats itself, Aereo
may live on.”).
280. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)).
281. See infra Part IV (discussing how the Court’s decision will affect cloud computing).
282. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
283. The Court’s opinion is actually completely silent on the issue of the volitional act
requirement. See id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting its absence in the Court’s opinion).
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how to determine when transmissions are private.284 And third, the
Court’s decision breeds uncertainty in what standard applies when a
new technology allegedly infringes a public performance right.285
Prior to Aereo, each court of appeals that had addressed directinfringement claims against the providers of automated digital systems
applied the volitional act test before liability was assigned.286 This was
seen as a common sense rule in an era of digitized, automatic services in
which system providers typically do not know what their users are
doing.287 The Court, however, did not utilize this rule.288 In fact, it
made no reference to it when it found that Aereo “performs” publicly
under the Copyright Act.289 As Justice Scalia reasoned, if the volitional
act requirement is not dispositive for Aereo, then it likely was not in
other contexts as well.290 For example, one prong of the RS-DVR case

284. This is meant only in the context of the Internet where such determinations were harder
to begin with. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 23–27 (discussing the implications of
Petitioners’ interpretation and what it could mean for the determination of public versus private
performances in the context of cloud computing); Shalini Ramachandrea & Shira Ovide, Aereo
Ruling Muddies the Picture on Cloud Storage, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2014), http://online.wsj.com
/articles/aereo-ruling-muddies-the-picture-on-cloud-storage-1403736175 (noting that many legal
professionals stated that the Court’s decision creates uncertainty).
285. This is essentially the bulk of Justice Scalia’s dissent. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing
Justice Scalia’s dissent).
286. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, §
7.0.2 (discussing the use of the volitional act requirement by the lower courts to determine
liability for Internet-based entities).
287. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 251213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the volitional act
requirement); 2 PATRY, supra note 21, § 9:5.50 (“Although copyright is a strict liability
statute . . . ‘there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.’” (internal citation omitted)).
288. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion
“greatly disrupts settled jurisprudence” by not utilizing the volitional act test); Andrew S. Fraker
et al., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.: Supreme Court Departs from Volitional Act Test for
Copyright Infringement, NGELAW (July 3, 2014), http://www.ngelaw.com/abc-aereo-ip-alert
(“[The] Court declined to . . . [analyze] that direct infringement must involve an act of volitional
conduct directed at the copyrighted work.”).
289. Instead the Court adopted a functional approach, assessing whether Aereo was
“substantially similar” to cable television. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (assessing whether
Aereo is the functional equivalent of cable television and thus should be subject to liability under
the Copyright Act as Congress intended cable television to be); Peter Menell & David Nimmer,
Symposium: Aereo, Disruptive Technology, and Statutory Interpretation, SCOTUSBLOG (June
26, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-disruptive-technol
ogy-and-statutory-interpretation/ (“The majority applied a functional lens to vindicate Congress’s
intent in crafting what constitutes a public performance [in the Copyright Act] . . . .”).
290. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the effect of the Court’s
ruling in regards to the use of the volitional conduct requirement); Schruers, supra note 225
(noting “the majority leaves unclear when technology services are regulated under rules of
standard secondary liability, with its well-established requirement of volitional conduct” and
when they are viewed under Aereo’s functional lens).
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Cablevision was that the cable provider did not “perform” when its
users recorded programs and subsequently watched them because the
cable provider engaged in no volitional act.291
Aereo possibly did away with this prong of that decision. Therefore,
if the Court did not need to look to whether the RS-DVR provider
engaged in a volitional act, and it can argue that subscribers’ individual
recordings of the same work, when independently transmitted aggregate
to a public performance, then providers of RS-DVR technology may be
infringing now as well.292 So if the volitional act test no longer limits
liability for RS-DVRs, it is conceivable then to arrive at the bizarre
result that the use of at-home DVRs is a non-infringing private use, but
when the DVR is relocated offsite it suddenly becomes an infringing,
“public” performance even though nothing has changed except the
distance between the television and the DVR.293
Likewise, under the Court’s Aereo analysis, a public performance
may be found to exist by aggregating individual transmissions from
separate copies transmitted through the same entity (a service provider)
to unrelated recipients.294 This begs the question: Can multiple
291. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC. Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). In
describing Cablevision’s lack of a volitional act in copying the material the court noted:
Here, by selling access to a system that automatically produces copies on command,
Cablevision more closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers to use a
photocopier on his premises, and it seems incorrect to say, without more, that such a
proprietor “makes” any copies when his machines are actually operated by his
customers.
Id.; see Bodner, supra note 104, at 515–19 (discussing the use of the volitional act test in the
Cablevision decision).
292. See Eric Goldman, Four Unanswered Questions From Aereo’s Supreme Court Loss,
FORBES (June 24, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/06/25/fourunanswered-questions-from-aereos-supreme-court-loss/ (“[Aereo] further reinforces the riskiness
of DVR-as-a-service [RS-DVR] when it says the simultaneous delivery of content to multiple
viewers is an infringement, even if the system stores and delivers a personal copy for each
viewer . . . .”); Timothy B. Lee, The Supreme Court’s Aereo Decision Could Endanger Cloud
Storage Services, VOX (June 25, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/6/25/5841820/thesupreme-courts-aereo-decision-could-endanger-cloud-storage (quoting University of Maryland
law professor James Grimmelmann, who stated that after Aereo, “the reasoning of Cablevision is
dead”).
293. The legality of VTR and VHS technology has long been settled. See Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (ruling on the legal use of VTR and VHS
technology); supra Part I.E (providing an expanded discussion). DVRs without remote storage
have also been found to be non-infringing. See generally Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network
L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a DVR technology offered by Dish Network to be
non-infringing and citing heavily from Sony); 2 PATRY, supra note 21, § 10:87 (discussing DVR
litigations).
294. This is the direct opposite conclusion that the Second Circuit found. Compare Aereo,
134 S. Ct. at 2509 (focusing on whether the underlying work is offered to the public), with
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689–90 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498
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transmissions of the same work, from separate copies, and originating
from a single provider (such as is routinely done in cloud computing) be
private? Or more pointedly, when are they ever not “to the public”?295
The Court did not directly deal with this question, but suggested that
one’s “relationship to the underlying work” or if one “acts as [an]
owner[] or possessor[]” may be influential in making this
determination.296 However, the Court’s dicta serves only to create more
questions: What is a sufficient “relationship” and when is one acting as
“an owner or possessor” to make a particular transmission private and
non-infringing?297 Because the Court did not explain its meaning, it
invites litigation and creates uncertainty for cloud developers and
copyright law generally.
Finally, in addition to the above confusion, the Court’s decision
created a new manner in which to infringe: being sufficiently similar to
cable television.298 Recall, at the heart of the Court’s decision was the
(2014) (arguing against the proposition that individual transmissions can be aggregated for a
single performance “to the public,” and instead focusing on the audience of a particular
transmission).
295. See Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 20 (regarding Petitioners’ view of the Transmit
Clause: “This view offers little clarity to the cloud music industry or its investors. If multiple
users uploaded and later accessed the same sound recording, even if those files were separately
stored and made accessible solely to the uploading user, the relevant copyright owner could point
to the aggregation theory to argue that a public performance has occurred”).
296. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510–11; see Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 31–32
(also arguing that a ruling in favor of the petitioners need not affect individuals accessing
“lawfully-owned copies” and could be limited to situations like Aereo, that offers access to
content in “the first instance”).
297. While this is certainly an easy question in the context of physical reproductions of
copyrighted works, the question becomes less clear as copyrighted work is digitized. See Brief of
36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 32 (discussing how Petitioners’ interpretation could sweep
up legally acquired content stored in the cloud as well). Professors Giblin and Ginsburg also
provide an illustrative example of this issue in their paper. See supra note 164 and accompanying
text (quoting in full Giblin and Ginsburg’s example of how cloud storage providers could be
infringing public performance rights when users upload legitimately reproduced works); see also
Alex Barinka & Caitlin McCabe, Aereo Ruling Sidesteps Cloud Computing Copyright Question,
BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2104, 10:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-26/aereoruling-sidesteps-cloud-computing-copyright-question.html (“While the court may have prevailed
in its intentions to avoid ruling on cloud computing, companies are still left without guidance on
whether their technology is legal.”); Lackman, supra note 22 (“While the architecture of cloudbased “lockers” must have been on the Court’s mind when describing the “relationship”
distinction, what may constitute a “relationship”—be it a cable subscription, a prior purchase of
the specific work, or something else—is left unexplained.”).
298. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing this new standard as
“guilt by resemblance”); Stoltz, supra note 23 (commenting on the Aereo decision that “[i]f the
statutory language can’t be relied on, what rule will apply? The opinion sets out guidelines that
more closely resemble the open-ended fair use analysis, or perhaps the proximate cause analysis
in a tort case. A system makes public performances if a court determines that it falls in the
“context” of cable and has “substantial similarity” to that business.”).
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idea that Aereo had to be infringing because it was too similar to cable
television—a technology that Congress clearly intended to make
liable.299 Thus, how will courts know when other technologies are
similar enough to cable television to warrant inclusion? Is RS-DVR
technology similar enough? What about Simple.tv?300 The Court only
addressed Aereo’s “Watch” feature, but Aereo’s service included
playback of previously recorded material as well.301 If Aereo prevented
the transmission of a program until after it finished airing, would Aereo
avoid the Court’s similarity-to-cable scrutiny?302 If the answer is no,
then Aereo becomes unsettlingly close to basic “time shifting,” with the
only difference being the location of the recording that the user made,303
and that the Court, since Sony, has found to be non-infringing fair use.
304 As of yet, the above questions have no answers; the Court did not
provide any and the litigation such uncertainty invites has not
occurred.305
299. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–07 (discussing the Court’s cable television decisions, the
passing of the Copyright Act, and Aereo’s similarity to the CATV systems); supra Part II.C.2
(reviewing the Court’s reasoning in Aereo).
300. See Mozilla Brief, supra note 164, at 19–27 (discussing how rejecting the Second
Circuit’s approach for some other standard would create uncertainty for certain cloud computing
models, including Simple.tv); Stoltz, supra note 23 (“Defining the bounds of “similarity” to a
cable system will require much litigation, and cases comparing cloud storage systems and other
new technologies against cable systems will be complex and expensive.”).
301. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676, 681 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct.
2498 (2014) (describing the two distinct “Watch” and “Record” features that Aereo offered);
Howe, supra note 19 (noting the live and future playback options Aereo offered).
302. This question was posed by Justice Scalia in his dissent:
If similarity to cable-television service is the measure [of liability] . . . . consider the
implications of that answer: Aereo would be free to do exactly what it is doing right
now so long as it built mandatory time shifting into its “watch” function. Aereo would
not be providing live television if it made subscribers wait to tune in until after a
show’s live broadcast ended. A subscriber could watch the 7 p.m. airing of a 1–hour
program any time after 8 p.m. Assuming the Court does not intend to adopt such a donothing rule (though it very well may), there must be some other means of identifying
who is and is not subject to its guilt-by-resemblance regime.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that of the possible
interpretations of the Court’s ruling “[o]ne would cover any automated service that captures and
stores live television broadcasts at a user’s direction. That can’t be right, since it is exactly what
remote storage digital video recorders (RS–DVRs) do . . . and the Court insists that its “limited
holding” does not decide the fate of those devices . . . .” (citations omitted)).
304. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(discussing how at-home recordings of programs are legitimate fair use time-shifting by
consumers and do not result in copyright infringement).
305. It should be noted that since the Aereo litigation has been remanded, the district court
judge granted the preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from rebroadcasting television shows
while those shows are still airing live, but rejected the copyright holders plea for an order that
would prevent Aereo from copying and storing shows for rebroadcast until after the original
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C. Viable Alternatives for Aereo that Still Protect
Copyright Holders
As the law stood before Aereo, a few alternatives would have likely
protected the petitioners’ interests without creating the uncertainty of
Aereo. First, because Aereo was found to be the functional equivalent
of cable television, it could be part of the same compulsory licensing
scheme to which the actual cable television providers are subject.306
Second, the Court could have remanded the case and let Aereo’s
liability be determined using the other theories of liability the
petitioners’ originally alleged.307 Third, even if the existing law is
insufficient to protect the interests of the petitioners, Congress is better
equipped to amend the Copyright Act—a solution the Court has allowed
previously when new technology caused troublesome results.308
Much of the Court’s opinion was spent detailing how similar Aereo
was to cable television, and how Congress intended to overturn the
Court’s earlier Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions when they

transmissions were finished. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 WL 5393867
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (order and opinion granting preliminary injunction); see Lyle
Denniston, Aereo Blocked from Real-Time TV Rebroadcasts, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 23, 2014, 7:27
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/aereo-blocked-from-real-time-tv-rebroadcasts/ (noting
that the judge “rejected, at least for now, a plea by the over-the-air broadcasting industry for an
order to also prohibit Aereo from copying and storing copyright video for later viewing).
306. See Stoltz, supra note 23 (noting that the section 111 compulsory license “remains [an
option] to Aereo as a result of the Court’s new approach”). It even appears that at least some of
the Petitioners’ would be open to this idea or something similar to it. See Adam Liptak & Emily
Steel, Aereo Loses at Supreme Court, in Victory for TV Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2014,
at B1 (“Mr. Moonves of CBS [one of the Petitioners in Aereo] said that he would welcome a
discussion with Aereo about a deal to distribute CBS programming if the start-up was prepared to
pay.”).
307. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I share the Court’s evident feeling
that what Aereo is doing . . . to the Networks’ copyrighted programming out not to be allowed . . .
[but] Aereo’s secondary liability for performance infringement is yet to be determined, as is its
primary and secondary liability for reproduction infringement.”); Brief of 36 Law Professors,
supra note 19, at 12 (commenting that Aereo is proceeding under the wrong theory of liability
and that the litigation should be over the secondary or contributory infringement theories).
308. The Court was confronted with a similar situation in the Sony VTR litigation and noted:
“The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign
of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.” . . . It may well
be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so often has
examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that have not
yet been written.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (quoting Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)); see EFF Brief, supra note 164, at 15
(arguing that Congress is best able to answer the questions with which Aereo confronts existing
copyright law).
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drafted the Copyright Act.309 While mentioned in passing, the Court in
Aereo did not dwell on one important provision that Congress included
to accomplish this goal: the compulsory license of section 111.310 To
ensure that the copyright holders were protected, Congress required
cable providers to report on the number of broadcast television channels
they retransmitted to the Register of Copyrights and pay royalties to the
copyright holders.311 While the Second Circuit had previously rejected
an argument by an Internet-television provider that it fell within section
111,312 given the Court’s conclusion that Aereo is so similar to these
cable providers, it is unclear under Aereo why section 111 should not
apply.313 Not only would this protect the petitioners’ interests, but it
would also allow Aereo to continue to operate, thus encouraging
innovation and thereby serving both goals of the Copyright Clause.314
Alternatively, the petitioners in Aereo initially alleged multiple forms
of infringement, including: secondary liability for both the public
performance and reproductions rights, as well as direct liability for
making unauthorized reproductions.315 However, the petitioners’

309. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505–07 (comparing Aereo to cable television); see supra Part II.C.2
(reviewing the Court’s determination that Aereo is similar to cable television).
310. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (mentioning that Congress included section 111 in the context
of providing evidence that Congress intended to overrule prior Court decisions relating to cable
television); see 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (setting out the compulsory license).
311. 17 U.S.C. § 111; see supra Part I.C (discussing the structure of the compulsory license).
312. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that “Congress did
not . . . intend for § 111’s compulsory license to extend to Internet transmissions”).
313. See Schruers, supra note 225 (“If an Internet service has an “overwhelming likeness” to
cable companies, it should presumably be entitled to the compulsory license crafted for cable
companies.”); see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing how the Court’s decision is premised on
Aereo being the functional equivalent to, and sharing substantial similarities with, cable
television).
314. Apparently, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision, Aereo has tried to argue
this position in the lower courts. See Andrew L. Deutsch et al., Following Loss Before Supreme
Court, Aereo “Astonishes” Broadcasters with New Legal Strategy, DLA PIPER (July 22, 2014),
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/07/following-loss/ (noting that in the
federal district court, Aereo asserted that it was entitled to the compulsory license). However, the
district court has since rejected Aereo’s argument because it found that the Supreme Court’s
decision did not overturn Second Circuit precedent, see supra note 312 and accompanying text
(discussing that the holding of WPIX remains valid), which concluded that section 111 did not
apply to transmission via the Internet. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 WL
5393867, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (order and opinion granting preliminary injunction);
Denniston, supra note 305 (“Judge Nathan, however, concluded that, even though the Supreme
Court had compared Aereo’s service to cable TV for purposes of deciding whether it was
‘performing’ the shows (instead of just letting its customers use its equipment to view them), the
Supreme Court had not said that Aereo was a cable TV operator. The judge went on to rule that
Aereo cannot qualify for that status, legally.”).
315. Am. Broad. Cos. Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (2012); see supra Part
II.B (reviewing the procedural history of the litigation).
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request at the district court level was for a preliminary injunction based
on Aereo’s alleged direct infringement of the public performance right,
and this was the only issue before the Court.316 Therefore, even if the
Court declined to impose liability for direct infringement of the public
performance right, Aereo’s liability for direct infringement of the
reproduction right and contributory infringement for both the
reproduction and public performance rights has yet to be decided.317
Arguably these other theories of liability would have been sufficient to
protect the copyright holders’ interests.318
Granted that Aereo’s direct liability for reproduction may be weak if
the lower courts applied the volitional act requirement,319 the
allegations of contributory infringement are more likely to succeed.320
Lower courts have previously held automated systems liable for various
forms of contributory infringement.321 The result would likely be that
Aereo was still infringing, the petitioners were still protected, and the
316. See Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (discussing the different theories of liability initially
alleged); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503 (the Court noting that the question before it is the limited one
of whether Aereo infringes the exclusive right to publically perform Petitioners’ protected works).
317. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that these alternative
theories of liability may be sufficient to protect copyright holders); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra
note 17, at 30 (noting, though ultimately disagreeing with the proposition, that the case could be
decided on the other theories of liabilities alleged in the complaint).
318. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra
note 19, at 4 (“[S]econdary liability is always available against those who culpably facilitate
infringement.”).
319. For the same reasons that Aereo argued here—that it should not be held liable for direct
infringement of the public performance right when its subscribers do the actual performing—
Aereo would likely claim that it did not engage in a volitional act when its system made a
recording of a protected work at the initiation of the subscriber. Cf. Brief for Respondent, supra
note 134, at 40 (arguing that Aereo’s subscribers, and not Aereo, do the actual performing); see
supra Part I.E (discussing how courts have looked to whether Internet based companies have
engaged in a volitional act before concluding that they are liable for an infringing reproduction).
Even without a volitional act requirement however, such a claim would be weak in light of the
safe harbor provisions for Internet service providers (if applied to Aereo) found in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012) (the safe harbor provisions limit
the potential liability of Internet service providers).
320. See Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 15 (“Again, none of this is to say that
Petitioners cannot show that Aereo is secondarily liable, only that they have not tried to do so
here. The road to secondary liability is well-marked and well-traveled. Copyright owners have
brought numerous successful lawsuits against secondary infringers who put new technologies to
harmful uses.”); cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–921
(2005) (finding a peer-to-peer filing sharing service liable for contributory infringement when it
was clear that the purpose of the software was to facilitate an infringing activity).
321. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (another
peer-to-peer file sharing case in which the Ninth Circuit found the provider liable for contributory
copyright infringement); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (finding an online-music storage locker liable for contributory infringement when its users
were storing pirated files in the storage locker).
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upshot would have been that copyright law would have avoided the
uncertainty the Court has created. Some scholars have argued though
that the Court needed to address this limited issue to resolve an
uncertainty in the public performance right.322 However, the copyright
protections were never meant to operate in isolation, but were in fact
intended to reinforce one another.323 Thus, the other theories of liability
may adequately prevent any loss of protection to rights holders, except
possibly in a very few circumstances.324
However, assuming the other protections were insufficient, this does
not mean that the Court must twist the Transmit Clause to ensure a just
outcome. As Justice Scalia mentioned in his dissent, if there is a hole in
the law, then Congress is better equipped to plug it.325 Like the Court
repeatedly emphasized throughout its opinion, it was Congress who
passed the Copyright Act to overturn Supreme Court decisions and
provide adequate protections to copyright holders.326 Additionally, the
322. See, e.g., Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 30 (Professor Ginsburg noting “the
potential for harmful exploitation of the existing law . . . suggests that this is the right time for the
Supreme Court to find a more principled reading of the transmit clause, without necessarily
taking on the predicate reproduction right issues”).
323. Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 9. The authors of this brief further argued
that because the exclusive rights are a system they “must be read in concert” and the fact that the
rights are narrow and carefully defined demonstrates “Congress’s expectations that each right will
be construed strictly to its terms.” Id.; see 2 PATRY, supra note 21, § 8:8 (noting on the drafting
of the exclusive rights in the Copyright Act “Congress attempted to draft a statute with provisions
flexible enough to avoid the necessity of revision every time a new expressive medium was
developed”).
324. For the type of exploitation that Professor Ginsburg is concerned about under the Second
Circuit’s interpretation, to actually occur there would need to be an automated system that only
implicated the public performance right, with no reproduction or contributory infringement
potential. As far as this author is aware, such a technology has not been litigated. See 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, § 7.0.2 (noting that the particular challenge the Internet poses to
copyright law is the “automatic[] reproduc[tion]” of protected works (emphasis added)). In fact,
the supposed loophole that Aereo used (and which is feared could be exploited by others) is
predicated on the existence of individual copies, which, therefore, necessarily implicates
reproduction protections under the Act, as well as theories of contributory infringement. See Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (noting that Aereo’s system
works by creating individual copies of a work, available to a single subscriber). Moreover, even
if such a technology were to develop, as the Court said regarding the concerns its decision would
have on cloud computing, the Court “should await a case in which [such technologies] are
squarely presented.” Id. at 2511.
325. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see EFF Brief, supra note 164, at 15–18
(discussing how in the past the Court has deferred to Congress when new technologies disrupt
existing law). See generally Reyman, supra note 1, ch. 5 (discussing the balance between
copyright law and technological change and noting the role of Congress).
326. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–07 (reviewing Congress’s intent to overturn the Supreme
Court’s CATV decisions); see supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the majority’s opinion and how
Congress passed the Copyright Act to reverse the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s CATV
cases).
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Court even stated that if commercial actors are concerned that their
interests are not being protected under the Copyright Act, they can
always seek actions from Congress;327 while the Court referred to cloud
computing entities here, the option is equally available to the
petitioners. Moreover, the history of copyright in the United States
confirms Congress’ role in updating the copyright law when new
technologies make old law ineffective.328 There are strong legislative
competency arguments that support this approach as well, and the Court
previously had deferred to Congress because of these concerns.329
After Aereo, lower courts are confronted with a host of new questions
when dealing the copyright infringement cases.330 The Court’s attempt
to interpret the Transmit Clause in a technologically neutral way was
likely unsuccessful and ignored the other constitutional aim of
promoting the public interest through encouraging innovation.331 As a
result, the Court has thrown into legal uncertainty technologies that
relied on lower court’s use of the volitional act test to limit liability.332
Moreover, other elements of copyright law are now less clear and there
is a new indistinct standard to determine liability, both of which will
surely invite litigation.333 All of this was needless however, as the
Court had an arsenal of alternatives that would not have sacrificed
copyright law’s clarity in an attempt to address a narrow, isolated

327. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (discussing how interested commercial actors can petition
Congress for action if they are unsatisfied with the existing law).
328. See Reyman, supra note 1, at 55–58 (reviewing the historical expansion of copyright law
in the United States). Professor Reyman goes so far as to state: “[c]opyright law and
technological development are inseparable. In fact, it was technological advancement that served
as the impetus for the development of copyright law in the first place.” Id. at 57; see supra Part I
(reviewing how technological change has prompted Congress to amend copyright law and various
points in the country’s history).
329. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“Th[e] evolution of the duration of
copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces . . . [I]t is not our role to
alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of [rights] that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the
public appropriate access to their work product.”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383
U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course,
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best
effectuates the constitutional aim.”).
330. Stoltz, supra note 23; see supra Part III.B (discussing the various questions that the
Court’s ruling in Aereo raises).
331. See supra Part III.A (discussing how the Court ignores the second element inherent in the
Constitution’s copyright clause).
332. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the Court’s silence on the volitional act requirement
throws into question prior lower court rulings).
333. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the Court’s decision provides little guidance in how,
or when, to apply its new “substantially similar” analysis).
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issue.334 Thus, the Court’s concern to protect copyright holders from
Aereo and its focus on tackling one set of ambiguities (the definition’s
of “performance” and “to the public” under the Copyright Act) has lead
it to inadvertently create other uncertainties, particularly for emerging
cloud-based technologies.335
IV. IMPACT
The Court quickly dismissed Aereo’s and many amici’s concerns that
a ruling favoring the petitioners would have far-reaching effects on
other technologies not before the Court, particularly cloud
computing.336 The Court reasoned that its decision was limited to
Aereo and did not implicate other circumstances, such as when users
acted as “owners or possessors” of the content, suggesting that the
user’s relationship to the content could help shield them from
liability.337 However, the Court failed to appreciate how lower courts
will rely on the Court’s interpretation to assess potential cloud
computing liability issues (despite its intended narrow application) and
how the decision’s inherent uncertainty will likely stifle development in
new cloud technologies.338 This Part explores the implications of the
Court’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause, including the uncertainty
it creates in a digital environment,339 and further considers the effect

334. See supra Part III.C (discussing alternatives to the Court’s decision that would have
protected copyright holders).
335. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014) (noting “this
case requires us to answer” whether Aereo “perform[s]” and if it does “publicly”); id. at 2517
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or enabling
to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought not to be allowed.”); Schruers,
supra note 225 (commenting on the uncertainty that the majority opinion creates).
336. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510–11; see David Kravets, Analysis: Aereo’s Death Leaves Cloud
Computing Hanging in the Balance, ARSTECHNICA (June 25, 2014, 3:36 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/analysis-aereos-death-leaves-cloud-computing-hangin
g-in-the-balance/ (“Call Aereo whatever you want, but the process seems a lot like cloud
computing. All of which leads to the question of whether a license is needed to stream
copyrighted content from Dropbox, for example? The court’s majority doesn’t go there, and it
instead focuses on Aereo acting like a cable TV service and hence being treated like one.”).
337. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510; see Lackman, supra note 22 (analyzing the Court’s attempt
and limiting the application of its ruling to other technologies); supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the
Court’s treatment its decision will have on other technologies).
338. See John Bergmayer, Uh oh, Aereo, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (June 30, 2014),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/uh-oh-aereo (discussing how the Court’s
ruling could affect cloud computing); David Talbot, Aereo Ruling Means Uncertainty for Cloud
Streaming Services, MIT TECH. REV. (June 25, 2014) http://www.technologyreview.com/news/52
8631/aereo-ruling-means-uncertainty-for-cloud-streaming-services/ (discussing how the Court’s
decision leaves open the possibility of it being applied to cloud technologies).
339. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the implications the Court’s decision has for the digital
environment).
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this could have for the growth of cloud computing.340
A. Aereo’s Emphasis on Particular Transmissions
in the Digital Age
History, and the constitutional provision itself, illustrates that
copyright law in the United States has been a balance of protecting the
interests of the rights holders and promoting innovation and the spread
of knowledge.341 However, the Court’s Aereo decision represents a
swing far to the protectionist side and away from promoting the public’s
interest in access to innovative technologies.342
The decision
interpreted the Transmit Clause to allow the aggregation of separate
transmissions from separate copies passing to different consumers via
the same provider to be classified as an infringing “public
performance.”343 This undoubtedly adds to the protections for owners
of protected works that are available over the Internet by extending the
public performance right and limiting how the form, or structure, of
technology may be used to circumvent those rights.344 However, given
that the vast majority of content that has been relocated to the cloud is

340. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the Aereo decision will affect cloud computing
specifically).
341. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (discussing the purpose and
function of the Copyright Clause); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (“Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to
serve the public welfare and not necessarily so as to maximize an author’s control over his or her
product.”); Graeme Austin, Radio: Early Battles Over the Public Performance Right, in
COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW, supra note 1, §§ 5.01 to 5.04 (discussing the
development of radio and the industry’s legislative push to amend copyright to have its
broadcasts protected). See generally NG, supra note 37 (analyzing the limitations to copyright
protections as a result of constitutional goal of promoting social and cultural advancement); supra
Part I.A (discussing the foundation’s of United States Copyright law).
342. Schruers, supra note 225 (“[T]he Court’s approach offers technology lawyers counseling
clients little guidance. Who can predict whether a non-tech savvy federal judge will think that the
next innovative service ‘looks like cable’? Yesterday’s decision creates considerable uncertainty,
suggesting that lawyers should counsel their clients based on what analogy will most appeal to a
federal judge in the distant future. The Court . . . promises its opinion won’t threaten new
technology, but as the dissent points out, it cannot deliver on that promise.”); see infra note 361
and accompanying text (discussing the weight of the Court’s limiting language in its decision).
343. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014); see
Lackman, supra note 22 (noting that the Court answered “whether Aereo’s series of one-to-one
transmissions” are to the public in the affirmative).
344. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 137, at 18 (arguing that the petitioners’ need
protection from Aereo’s “unauthorized exploitation of copyrighted content” via its separate
transmission and separate copies model); Lackman, supra note 22 (discussing the Court’s
interpretation of the Transmit Clause and what it means for there to be a “public performance”);
Liptak & Steel, supra note 306 (describing the decision as “a major victory [for] the broadcast
networks”).
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protected by copyright,345 which then by necessity requires transmission
back to the user for access,346 the implications of the Court’s
interpretation are immense.347
B. The Future of the Cloud
Cloud computing has many different iterations but the basic elements
are the remote storage of users’ content that can then be accessed on
different Internet-connected devices.348 For certain forms of content,
like audiovisual works, this typically means “streaming” (direct
playback without downloading to a local hard drive first).349 Therefore,
if such streaming transmissions were “to the public,” because they
“communicate contemporaneously visible images and audible sounds of
the work,” they would constitute infringing public performances under
the Copyright Act.350 However, in 2008, the Second Circuit appeared
to limit the ability for such transmissions to be characterized as “to the
public” by adopting an interpretation of the Transmit Clause that held
that separate transmissions, made from separate copies, of the same
underlying work could not be classified as public performances.351

345. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 23 (“In today’s world, most content is protected
by copyright, and for reasons of security and convenience, a great deal of that material is stored
on remote servers which can be accessed by users online.”); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
70, § 7.0.2 (discussing the particular challenge the Internet poses to copyright law).
346. Even under the Court’s interpretation, not all transmissions would result in a
performance, only those transmissions that “communicat[ed] contemporaneously visible images
and contemporaneously audible sounds of the work.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. The distinction
is the difference between a download (which has no contemporaneous playback) and “streaming”
content, which does. See infra note 349 and accompanying text (contrasting streaming to
downloading). Under Aereo, it would appear only streaming content constitutes as a transmission
under the Transmit Clause.
347. See Lee, supra note 292 (describing the Court’s decision as “a mess that will take lower
courts years to clean up”); Ramachandrea & Ovide, supra note 284 (providing quotations from
various law professors anticipating that the Court’s decision will have important consequences for
cloud computing); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the Court’s ruling affect on cloud
computing).
348. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (providing the National Institute of Standards
and Technology’s definition for cloud computing).
349. See What is Streaming?, BBC (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/guides/ab
out-streaming. The BBC’s WebWise Team provides the following definition: “Streaming means
listening to music or watching video in ‘real time’, instead of downloading a file to your
computer and watching it later. With internet videos and webcasts of live events, there is no file
to download, just a continuous stream of data.” Id.
350. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act); Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014) (“[I]n light of the purpose and text of the
Clause, we conclude that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible
images and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them regardless of the
number of discrete communications it makes.”).
351. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536. F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir 2008); see supra
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Partially as a result of the legal certainty this decision, from a typically
copyright friendly circuit, provided cloud developers, investment in
cloud platforms increased by nearly forty-one percent following the
ruling.352
The Court in Aereo has likely cast these developments back into
doubt. Aereo adopted the opposite view that allows for the aggregation
of separate transmissions to create one “public performance.”353 Now,
once again, a provider of cloud services must confront whether they are
engaged in a public performance when their users, accessing separate
copies of the same work stored on the provider’s network, stream that
content to themselves.354 Under the Aereo decision, it is clear that it
does not matter that the cloud provider did not engage in any volitional
act beyond offering the service in the first place.355 In recognition of
the effect its Aereo ruling could have on cloud systems, the Court
attempted to limit its holding by excluding from its definition of “to the
public” when users are acting in their capacities as legitimate owners.356
The Court however, did not provide any guidance on how to determine
when a user is acting in such a capacity.357 If the Court was adopting

Part I.D (discussing the Cablevision litigation).
352. Josh Lerner & Greg Rafert, Lost in the Clouds: The Impact of Copyright Scope on
Investment in Cloud Computing Ventures 17 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard
Business School) (“[A]verage quarterly investment in U.S. cloud computing increased by
approximately 41 percent after the Cablevision decision.”). As the authors’ note in their paper
another reason for the feeling of legal certainty was “because the Second Circuit has historically
been seen as sympathetic to copyright owners.” Id. at 10. As noted above, such a result is
unsurprising, it was the legal uncertainty facing nascent VoIP technology that stalled its
development. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (noting the experience of VoIP
technology).
353. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509; see supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Court’s decision and its
interpretation of the Transmit Clause).
354. See Barinka & McCabe, supra note 297 (describing the uncertainty the Court’s ruling
creates for cloud technologies); Kravets, supra note 336 (discussing the potential effect the
Court’s decision will have); Stoltz, supra note 23 (noting that the Court’s decision creates some
flexibility “[b]ut with flexibility comes uncertainty, and with uncertainty comes litigation”).
355. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2516–17 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court concluded
that Aereo is directly liable for copyright infringement without any evidence of a volitional act);
Fraker, supra note 288 (noting that the Court’s opinion is a departure from the volitional act
requirement).
356. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510; see supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Court’s decision).
357. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (regarding the Court’s assertion that its
ruling will have limited effect on cloud computing, “it cannot deliver on that promise given the
imprecision of its result-driven rule”); Joan E. Solsman, How Supreme Court Ruling Affects
Aereo, the Cloud, and You, CNET (June 26, 2014, 8:09 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/howthe-supreme-court-ruling-affects-aereo-the-cloud-and-you/ (quoting Professor Jessica Litman of
the University of Michigan School of Law: “The majority opinion doesn’t give courts much
guidance besides examining an individual’s relationship with the content as an owner or
possessor, she said. ‘What now happens to all of my Kindle books in Amazon’s cloud? Am I the
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the distinction the United States, in its amicus brief, made—Aereo
“provides a means by which consumers can gain copyrighted content in
the first instance” whereas cloud services allow users to receive
transmissions of works “after the consumers have lawfully acquired
their own copies”—not all cloud services are excluded by this
differentiation.358 For example, as a group of amici law professors
noted, Amazon offers consumers content for download “in the first
instance,” which can be stored directly on Amazon’s cloud storage
before a consumer can then stream to herself.359 After Aereo, to
determine the legality of certain cloud services, as Justice Scalia argued,
will take years of litigation.360 Moreover, the Court’s attempt to limit
its decision to just the facts before will likely be unsuccessful; it is the
owner of the book? Am I the owner of the digital copy? Am I the owner of the license? Whether
one is the owner or possessor of content . . . is again pretty much up in the air.’”); Stoltz, supra
note 23 (noting the uncertainty the Court’s opinion leaves for how to determine when these
criteria have been met).
358. Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 14. The United States characterizes the
difference between Aereo and cloud services as follows:
A consumer’s playback [over the cloud] of her own lawfully-acquired copy of a
copyrighted work to herself will ordinarily be a non-infringing private performance,
and it may be protected by fair-use principles as well.Respondent’s
service,
by
contrast, enables subscribers to gain access to copyrighted content in the first
instance—the same service that cable companies have traditionally provided.
Id.
359. Brief of 36 Law Professors, supra note 19, at 32–33. The Professors’ rebuttal to this
interpretation is:
But nowhere does the United States explain why that distinction makes any difference
whatsoever under the Transmit Clause or the public performance right more generally.
Amazon . . . offers cloud storage services to consumers who have obtained copyrighted
content from Amazon itself; under this reasoning, would Amazon be liable for publicly
performing those works because it “provides a means by which consumers can gain
access to copyrighted content in the first instance”? Aereo’s system is functionally
equivalent to RS-DVRs and other cloud storage services for this purpose; users have
lawful access to the television broadcast programming that they record using the Aereo
system, have “lawfully acquired” their own copies of those works that they have stored
on that system, and receive private performances of those works.
Id. (citations omitted).
360. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1832, 1838 (2009) (arguing that legal uncertainty in the area of copyright law
consistently has a delaying effect on innovation and development of new technologies).
Professor Depoorter’s article contains a very illustrative table outlining the timeline between
when a new technology is introduced, the subsequent lawsuits, and the number of years it took for
the legal issue to be resolved; the chart includes technologies such as VCR, DVR, and Grokster
(discussed supra Part II.B–E of this Article). Id. at 1843; see Lawrence B. Solum & Minn
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815,
948 (2004) (noting the importance of transparency in allowing the Internet and Internet-based
technologies to thrive); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property
Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 538 (arguing for a new model of intellectual property policy in
part because the current model does not facilitate Internet innovation).
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Court’s reasoning (its particular interpretation of the Transmit Clause)
that is now binding, and that reasoning itself has no limiting principle
distinguishing cloud computing from Aereo’s technology.361 Therefore,
the Court has brought legal uncertainty to cloud services where there
was none before; possibly turning some into unwitting copyright
infringers, and the practical effect of this will be to increase the risk of
liability for developers of new cloud-based systems.362
An additional area of uncertainty for cloud-service providers is that
of the user who is actually uploading illegally obtained content or
content that would become infringing if performed publicly.363 The
Court’s language is possibly a shield to users transmitting lawfully
obtained copies;364 but what about the cloud provider host of useruploaded infringing content? Are they required to monitor for such
content? Aereo, in its brief, as well as other interested scholars
expressed concern of the debilitating effects a legal obligation to

361. See Bergmayer, supra note 338 ( “[i]nstead, the Court uses reasoning that could apply
very easily to any number of online services—file hosting, cloud lockers, even VPNs—as well as
services that no one has even come up with yet. It then simply declares that Aereo is different,
because it looks so much like cable. Actually, only the Supreme Court’s actual legal reasoning is
binding on future courts—the rest of the opinion is just ‘dicta’ . . . . Dicta has the same legal
status as legislative history—which is to say, it’s as binding as lower courts want it to be. A
lower court is bound by a higher court’s legal holdings, not its stated intent.”); Schruers, supra
note 225 (noting after the Aereo decision “[t]he result may be that investors and venture
capitalists will direct their resources away from anything that could be construed to “perform”
potentially copyrightable works. Unfortunately, this is precisely the time that content creators
need more lawful services to compete with increasingly sophisticated unlawful offerings available
online”); Talbot, supra note 338 (commenting that even after the Court’s decision the legal
certainty of cloud streaming services remains unclear).
362. See Bergmayer, supra note 338 (noting how the Court’s decision is potentially
transferable to other technologies); Schruers, supra note 225 (noting how the Court’s decision
could deter investment away from cloud computing); see also text accompanying supra notes
360–61 (discussing the effects legal certainty has on investment into cloud computing and how
the Court’s decision could implicate cloud computing).
363. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 50–51 (discussing how Petitioners’
interpretation of the Transmit Clause (essentially the interpretation the Court adopts) could lead
to cloud service providers being liable for user uploaded infringing content); Giblin & Ginsburg,
supra note 17, at 26–27 (discussing the possibility of cloud service providers being liable for
public performances when users legally obtained copies become infringing when performed over
the Internet).
364. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510–11 (2014)
(discussing how the definition of “to the public” does not extend to “those who act as owners or
possessor of the relevant product” (emphasis added)). Thus the user of lawfully obtained content
is clearly intended to be excluded from the Court’s interpretation. However, as examined above,
it is unclear exactly, when such a user is acting in such a capacity, or, when the cloud provider is
acting (or facilitating the user) to act in this prescribed capacity. See Solsmen, supra note 357
(noting the lack of guidance the Court provides for this definition); see also text accompanying
supra notes 357–59 (discussing how this distinction is unclear).
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monitor for such content would pose to cloud services.365 They even
questioned if the DMCA safe harbor provisions for Internet service
providers would shield cloud providers in such a context.366 The
Court’s ruling however, did not address these issues fully, explicitly
conceding at one point that it could not offer a more “precise” answer
until such a cloud-based technology was before it.367
Because Aereo is such a recent decision, and it implicates the everevolving landscape of Internet technology, it is difficult to state with
accuracy how Aereo will affect cloud services. However, it is clear,
even in the Court’s opinion, that some effect is anticipated.368 The
interpretation of the Transmit Clause put forth by the Court in Aereo too
readily tracks the contours of the cloud technological model for it to be
otherwise.369 What is not clear though, as a result of the Court’s
interpretation of the Transmit Clause, is how to determine cloud
computing’s liability under existing copyright law.370 This result was
365. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 51 (“[T]o avoid strict liability based on its
customers’ actions, the company would have to monitor all of the content stored on its system to
make sure it was ‘licensed’ or otherwise ‘authorized.’ No industry could operate under such an
obligation.” (citation omitted)); Michael Walker, Jr. A Better Public Performance Analysis for
Digital Music Locker Storage, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 629, 657 (2013) (noting that so far only one
case—Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)—has
addressed the public performance liability for digital storage lockers and it found that the storage
locker had not publically performed); Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 26–27 (“[I]mposing
new liability upon a host to remove such non-infringing content in order to avoid public
performance liability is unprecedented and troubling. Moreover, because the § 512(c) safe harbor
[of the DMCA] contemplates content provided by the user, it would not apply to the activities of
services that lawfully distribute downloads to the user’s storage locker. Those services therefore
would face unmitigated liability for subsequent unlicensed individualized streaming.” (citations
omitted)); Barinka & McCabe, supra note 297 (quoting New York University Law Professor
Jason Schultz as indicating: “‘This ruling is dangerous because it is saying the providers now
have additional responsibilities to think about, which may differ user-by-user and file-by-file.’”).
366. Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 27. The authors note that the construction of
section 512(c) “appear[s] broad enough” to include content that, though originally un-infringing,
became infringing if publically performed, while also creating “unmitigated liability for
subsequent unlicensed individualized streaming” for services that directly provide content, and
thus the existence of such safe harbors . . . [does not] avoid all of the collateral damage that cloud
providers fear.” Id.
367. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“[It] cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit
Clause . . . will apply to technologies not before us.”).
368. See id. (noting that the Court will wait until a cloud computing case is directly before it).
369. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Slipping Down the Digital Slope,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/argument-analysis
-slipping-down-the-digital-slope/ (noting the degree of concern the Justices had during oral
arguments that its decision could affect cloud technologies); supra Part IV.B (discussing how
Court’s ruling implicates cloud computing).
370. Schruers, supra note 225 (noting that the dissent argued that the Aereo majority left
“unclear when technology services are regulated under rules of standard secondary liability, with
its well-established requirement of volitional conduct, ‘and which get the Aereo treatment.’”); see
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not necessary, and the uncertainty it creates will likely be enough to
obstruct the investment and innovation promised by cloud technology
while the ensuing litigations wind their way through the courts. As has
resulted in the past, Congress may eventually need to step in to amend
copyright law to better reflect the technological reality of today.
CONCLUSION
Aereo’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause has far-reaching
consequences in the still-developing digital environment. Aereo’s scope
encompasses aspects of the heretofore-legitimate activities of cloudservice providers’ remote storage of, and access to, content made
available to users via transmissions over the Internet. The Court’s brief
treatment of these critical implications only creates uncertainty for
cloud developers who, unsure if their innovations will be legal, likely
will scale back their investments in new cloud technologies. The likely
visible effects of this will be hard to quantify, as they will primarily be
in the negative: the absence of new inventions that were not pursued for
fear of running afoul of Aereo. Undoubtedly however, Aereo provides
broadcast television providers, as well as other rights holders, a fresh
argument to make when their material is shared over the Internet in new
ways.

supra Part III (discussing the uncertainty the decision creates applying the Copyright Act in the
context of the Internet and cloud computing).

